The Rohingya crisis lingers on even after seven years with no prospect of repatriation soon. Since the coup d'etat of February 2021, Myanmar Army's command has eroded significantly. There are new players at the Union level. In Rakhine, the Arakan Army has emerged as the dominant force and has taken an anti-Rohingya position.
Bangladesh yet again faces a new exodus. At the global level, the Rohingya crisis is getting overshadowed by conflicts in Ukraine, and Gaza. Meanwhile, a vastly different Interim Government has taken over governance in Bangladesh. All these now demand a deep reflection on the Rohingya policy pursued by the Awami League government.
As the Rogingya crisis unfolded in 2016-17, Bangladesh adopted a policy framework for Rohingya crisis management, comprising of sustainable return and general approach towards Myanmar. It had three major components-a) humanitarian assistance, b) address "root causes" in Rakhine Myanmar for sustainable return, and c) holding perpetrators accountable.
Given its principal focus on early repatriation, Bangladesh always had strong reservations on wage earning employment, self-employment, freedom of movement and the right to choose residence and naturalization provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Such obligations for Bangladesh were politically, demographically and economically not viable.
Bangladesh thus settled with a nomenclature forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals (FDMN), not refugees. In the camps with restricted access and opportunities, the Rohingya have been showing an increasing tendency to crimes. Unrestrained activities the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has added to insecurity in the camps.
Myanmar has historically seen the Rohingya, an ethnicity with deep racial, linguistic and religious links with erstwhile Bengal, and perceived them as aliens. Myanmar continue to see the Rohingya through a prism of insecurity. Her policy and actions have been motivated by a desire to ensure demographic balance in the northern Rakhine and by long-defined national priority to "defend the western gate". Myanmar's perceived insecurity comes also from its western neighbor- Bangladesh.
By July 2024 in Rakhine, the Arakan Army (AA) has emerged as the de facto authority in the Mayu-Kaladan- Lemro region, the traditional abode of the Rohingya. The de facto controlling force, AA holds all levers in Rakhine and has the ultimate say on repatriation. Yet, the Tatmadaw and the NUG remain equally important stakeholders on repatriation and on citizenship for the Rohingya.
Bangladesh may engage international stakeholders on developing safe zones within Rakhine to stop fresh flow of Rohingya and to consider options of enhanced humanitarian access
The AA leadership had sent signals to establish contact, that Bangladesh officially disregarded. AA cannot be expected to like Bangladesh handing over 700 fighters to Myanmar. Reported recruiting of Rohingya fighters in camps in Bangladesh by ARSA and RSO to fight beside the Tatrnadaw is another reason for AA taking an anti-Rohingya stance.
Importantly, with territorial hold over the state, the AA and the United League of Arakan (ULA) now have a historic opportunity to realise their Arakan dream. It is unclear at this stage whether they will seek to realise this as part of a truly federative structure within the Union of Myanmar or a quasi- autonomous region. While they seek to administer, they have an urgent task to arrange humanitarian supplies and stabilise Rakhine economically and reviving agriculture.
Besides, militarisation of almost all communities in Rakhine and Chin states is a source of instability in neighbouring Mizoram, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts and even some areas of Chittagong. Reemergence of ethnic conflicts recently in Manipur and Nagaland points to Indian vulnerability in the frontier areas and to its Kaladan multimodal project. China has direct stakes in Kyaukphyu port, and oil and gas pipelines to Yunnan. Meanwhile, the USA has signaled its keen interest in Myanmar.
The multiplicity of actors and their varied geo-strategic interests make things totally unpredictable in the areas bordering Bangladesh, Myanmar, India and China. Given the portends of regional instability, one cannot rule out Bangladesh being sucked into a vortex of military conflict. In 2017, the Myanmar Army and paramilitary forces did many things to draw Bangladesh into an armed conflict
As such, Bangladesh has to make a very hard task of creating a balanced approach to Rakhine and Myanmar. Bangladesh needs to revisit its outdated policy framework. As part of urgent review, Bangladesh ought to:
i. Engage all domestic stakeholders to develop a recalibrated Rohingya and Myanmar policy.
ii. Reflect seriously on what additional services that could be accorded to the Rohingya, such as access to employment and education as well as freedom of movement, with or without a change in the nomenclature to denote the Rohingya in Bangladesh.
iii. Ensure greater security measures in the camps and their neighbouring areas to keep control over the Rohingya armed groups.
iv. Consider some appropriate form of (indirect) engagement with AA/ ULA and discuss basic services, freedom of movement and citizenship for the Rohingya community, engage the NUG to secure a clear pathway towards citizenship of the Rohingya community.
V. Remain open to consideration of humanitarian access to Rakhine through Bangladesh; on economic stabilisation of the Rakhine state, Bangladesh may explore all options for economic interaction with the Chattogram region as well as for access for the produces of Rakhine to the outside world through an appropriate value chain linkage.
Given the changed ground realities and new refugee pressure, Bangladesh may engage international stakeholders on developing safe zones within Rakhine to stop fresh flow of Rohingya and to consider options of enhanced humanitarian access.
They may be asked to contribute to economic stabilisation of Rakhine and an array of livelihood support for the Rohingya returnees. Beyond retributive justice at ICC and ICJ, they should commence work on healing of trauma, reconciliatio: among the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhines.
In sum, Bangladesh requires to deploy a new brand of proactive and creative diplomacy to engage various stakeholders for better outcomes on the resolution of the Rohingya crisis and a mutually beneficial, multilayered relations with Myanmar.
* Mohammad Sufiur Rahman, former Bangladesh Ambassador to Myanmar and Senior Research Fellow, SIPG/North South University