Looking back at the chain of events that led to the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government during the July mass uprising, what do you consider the single most decisive moment?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: In my view, the decisive moment came when the government decided to deploy the army to confront the public. From observing various events both at home and abroad, I have found that authoritarian governments usually try to control unrest first by using the police and paramilitary forces. But when they have to bring in the army to suppress the people, the situation changes completely. Very few governments anywhere in the world have successfully crushed a mass movement by relying on the military.
I have told BNP leaders many times that no matter how large a movement they organise, no major change will occur until the military establishment aligns itself with the aspirations of the people. In the past, BNP held many large rallies and protests in Dhaka, but by the end of the day, the situation always returned to where it had been.
During the July movement, however, a different picture emerged once the army was deployed. The public did not treat soldiers as adversaries. Instead, people approached them, shook their hands, climbed onto armored vehicles, and spoke with them. This behaviour also influenced the soldiers. After all, they are members of the same society. Their families, relatives, and children were living through the same circumstances. At that point, I felt that once the army had entered the streets, it would be very difficult for the government to survive.
There was also a psychological dimension. For many years, certain forces, including the police, had been given special importance and privileges. The army saw those forces being used against the public. But when the military itself was finally placed face-to-face with common citizens, an internal resistance emerged. For a soldier, firing on the people of his own country is not an easy thing to do.
On 3 August 2024, the Army Chief convened a conference with army officers. How significant was that meeting?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: It was undoubtedly a significant development. The Army Chief may already have had some sense of the mood within the force, but after speaking directly with the officers, he gained a much clearer picture of the mindset of subordinate officers and soldiers, specifically, how far they were prepared to go in confronting the public.
Before making a decision, a commander must know whether the soldiers under his command will carry out his orders. My understanding is that the 3 August meeting provided a clear answer to that question. The message from within the force was that an order to fire indiscriminately on civilians would not be acceptable. That realisation played a major role in shaping the Army Chief's subsequent decisions.
When did the Army Chief first contact you during the July uprising?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I had never served at the same posting as General Waker-Uz-Zaman before. I had no direct acquaintance with him and had never met him personally.
When his father-in-law, General Mustafizur Rahman, was the Army Chief, I was serving in the Directorate of Military Operations. At the time, I worked extensively on matters relating to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, but I still had no direct interaction with Waker-Uz-Zaman.
At 12:20 am on the night of 4 August, he called me. I was somewhat surprised to receive the call. My children live abroad, and given the situation at the time, everyone in the family was worried. I, too, wondered why the Army Chief was summoning me so late at night.
On the phone, he was very brief. He said, "Please come tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. I have something to discuss with you." He said nothing more.
I am a retired general. If the Army Chief calls, whatever the reason, I have to go. That night, and even the following morning, I did not tell anyone in my political party about the call, because I had no idea why he had summoned me or what role, if any, he intended to assign me. I did not want to tell anyone in advance and then end up in an awkward situation if it turned out to be something entirely different.
What was discussed at your meeting with the Army Chief the following day, 5 August?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I arrived at his residence at exactly 10:00 am. The first thing I asked him was why he had called me when there were so many other people he could have chosen.
He replied that he knew I had connections with a political party. In addition to BNP leaders, many leaders from other political parties also knew me and regarded me as someone they could accept. For that reason, he wanted to entrust me with a responsibility.
The Army Chief made three points very clear. First, he said he did not want any more bloodshed. Second, he said he had no desire to take power himself. Third, he said he wanted a political solution to the ongoing crisis.
He explained that he wanted to hold discussions with the country's principal political stakeholders as quickly as possible. He said he was prepared to meet them wherever they wished, even if that meant going to their chosen location. The Army Chief asked me to convey this message to the country's leading political figures and to prepare them for discussions. Nothing he said suggested any intention of imposing military rule or assuming power himself. On the contrary, he repeatedly emphasised the need for a political solution.
Did you come away from that meeting believing that the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government was imminent?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: No one told me directly that the government would fall that very day. However, putting several factors together, I felt that something major was likely to happen within the next 24 hours.
By then, we were already aware of what had transpired at the 3 August meeting of army officers. Combined with the ongoing protests, the mood within the military, and the Army Chief's efforts to find a political solution, the overall situation was becoming increasingly clear.
As I left the Army Chief's residence, I felt that events were about to change rapidly. Later, when I went to the RAOWA (Retired Armed Forces Officers' Welfare Association) Club, I said, "Insha'Allah, something major may happen within the next 24 hours."
Prothom Alo :
Who was the first person you contacted after leaving the Army Chief's residence?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: After leaving, I first went to the Kurmitola Golf Club. From there, I called Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, the Secretary General of the BNP, and conveyed the Army Chief's message to him. He said it was a highly welcome initiative. I then told him, "The Army Chief has asked me to contact several other political leaders as well, but I don't have everyone's phone number. It would be helpful if you could take on that responsibility."
Mr. Fakhrul replied, "No, this responsibility has been given to you, so you should carry it out. If I do it, it may be perceived differently." He then provided me with the phone numbers of several political leaders.
I contacted Shafiqur Rahman, the Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami, Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Zonayed Saki, and several other political leaders.
Under the circumstances, reaching some of them was very difficult. Many were in hiding, while others had switched off their phones. It took considerable time, especially to establish contact with the Jamaat Ameer and Manna. Eventually, I was able to convey the Army Chief's message to them.
At that point, did you ask the political leaders to go directly to the Army Headquarters?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: Initially, I only informed them that the Army Chief wanted to hold discussions with the country's political leaders. At that stage, they were not yet asked to go to Army Headquarters.
After that, I went to the RAOWA Club. For security reasons, I left my mobile phone in the car because I was concerned that carrying it with me might allow my location to be tracked.
Outside the RAOWA Club, retired army officers had gathered for a rally and procession. I joined them, and we chanted slogans calling for the government's resignation.
At around 1:15 or 1:30 pm, I returned to my car and saw that I had received numerous missed calls on my phone. Army Headquarters wanted to know whether the political leaders I had been asked to contact were prepared for discussions. If they were, I was instructed to tell them to come to the Army Chief's office immediately.
I then called everyone again and told them to head to Army Headquarters as quickly as possible. I also told them that if they encountered any obstacles on the way, they should inform me of their location. If necessary, the army would bring them from wherever they were.
Did you also contact the leaders of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I had been asked to contact the country's principal political stakeholders. My assignment had clearly defined limits, and I did not want to exceed those limits by inviting anyone on my own initiative.
The Army Chief had placed particular emphasis on contacting the main political stakeholders, especially the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and other Islamist political parties. At that time, we primarily reached out to those who were publicly recognised as leading political figures.
Prothom Alo :
How did the political leaders react after receiving the Army Chief's message?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: Everyone responded positively. The July movement was not an event that had lasted only a day or two. Bloodshed, clashes, and unrest had been continuing for a long time. Everyone was looking for a way to bring it to an end.
The message that the Army Chief wanted a political solution and wished to sit down with the leaders naturally created hope among them. I did not see any reluctance from anyone. Everyone agreed to take part in the discussions quickly.
When did you reach the Army Headquarters? What did you see there?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: After making the second round of calls to the political leaders, I went home. I quickly performed my Zuhr prayers and then drove myself to Army Headquarters. As far as I recall, it was sometime between 1:30 and 1:45 pm.
When I arrived there, I saw that GM Quader, Chairman of the Jatiya Party, and Anisul Islam Mahmud had already arrived and were seated. Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, Secretary General of the BNP; Shafiqur Rahman, Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami; Mahmudur Rahman Manna; Zonayed Saki; Maulana Mamunul Haque; and leaders from various political and Islamic parties also arrived. Representatives from several smaller political parties were present as well.
Later, Asif Nazrul arrived there. From inside the Army Chief's office, he delivered a live message on social media. He urged the people of the country to remain patient and wait for good news.
At one point, the Army Chief told us that he had just received the news that Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had left the country. He then sought everyone's cooperation in forming an interim arrangement. The country had to continue functioning, that was the main concern at that moment.
After saying this, the Army Chief, along with the Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force, went outside and formally addressed the nation.
What was the atmosphere inside after hearing the news that Sheikh Hasina had left the country?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: It is difficult to express the feeling in words. I felt as though all the carbon dioxide in a room had been removed and an unlimited supply of oxygen had entered. There was a sense of relief among everyone.
People had been living in a suffocating situation for a long time. At that moment, it felt as though a great burden had been lifted. Everyone was jubilant. At the same time, however, there was also the enormous responsibility of governing the country and maintaining law and order ahead.
How was the decision made to go from Army Headquarters to Bangabhaban?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: After returning from delivering the address to the nation, the Army Chief said that he now needed to speak with the President and obtain his consent. He requested the political leaders to accompany him to Bangabhaban.
Initially, a few of them did not want to go. Their argument was that speaking with the President was the Army Chief’s responsibility, and that he should go and complete the task himself. At that point, Anisul Islam Mahmud and I said that if the Army Chief went alone and returned with a proposal, it might not be acceptable to the political leaders. If the political leaders went along, there would be direct discussions in front of the President, making it easier to reach a decision acceptable to everyone.
After that, everyone agreed to go. Two coaster buses were brought for the political leaders. The chiefs of the three services travelled ahead in their own vehicles. Several senior army officers and the then Director General of DGFI were also present. Armored vehicles accompanied the convoy for security.
As far as I remember, we departed from Army Headquarters in the afternoon. It was close to 7 pm when we reached Bangabhaban.
The situation inside the cantonment was calm. After crossing Jahangir Gate, we saw crowds celebrating. There were so many people on the streets that it became difficult for vehicles to move. Standing on a few drums, some political leaders appealed to the crowd to remain calm.
Seeing the people's joy brought tears to my eyes several times. Ropes had already been tied around the sculpture of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at Bijoy Sarani. I saw people coming out of Ganabhaban carrying various items. One young man was holding two chickens. He was telling Mirza Fakhrul Sahib that he had brought them from Ganabhaban and requested him to take them.
The entire scene was filled with a mixture of joy, emotion, and a degree of disorder.
What was discussed at the meeting at Bangabhaban?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: After arriving at Bangabhaban, everyone first offered prayers. At around 7:30 pm, the President arrived for the meeting. Political leaders, the chiefs of the three services, the Director General of DGFI, and other relevant officials were present there.
At the beginning, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir spoke. Expressing his agreement with the formation of an interim arrangement, he said that the first priority should be the immediate release of Begum Khaleda Zia.
President Mohammad Shahabuddin initially said that an interim government would be formed within a day or two, and that government could then decide on Khaleda Zia’s release. At that point, the Army Chief said, “Sir, at this moment the full authority rests with you (the President). You can release her right now.”
My impression was that the President was not opposed to releasing her. He perhaps wanted to leave the responsibility to the next government rather than make the decision himself. After the Army Chief clarified the matter, the process of deciding on Khaleda Zia’s release moved forward.
During the meeting, the Director General of DGFI (Major General Hamidul Haque) was regularly providing updates on the situation in different parts of Dhaka. He informed everyone present about incidents such as attacks on police stations, places where people were being killed, and the extent to which the law and order situation had deteriorated in various areas.
What proposals did you make at the Bangabhaban meeting?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I raised three issues. The first concerned the police. I said that the army could temporarily take responsibility for maintaining law and order, but in the long term, the army could not be a substitute for the police. However, intense public anger had developed against the police. Without addressing that anger, it would be difficult to return the police to their duties.
I proposed that several police officers who had been extensively involved in wrongdoing and repression should be arrested in accordance with the law, and that this action should be made visible. This would help people understand that accountability for wrongdoing had begun and would create an opportunity to rebuild public trust in the police.
My second proposal was to close the airspace. At the time, there were reports that various political leaders and officials were fleeing the country. I suggested that, temporarily, Bangladesh’s airspace and airports should be brought under control so that those accused could not escape.
The third issue was the release of detainees held in “Aynaghar” and other secret detention facilities.
How did the issue of releasing detainees from secret detention facilities, or “Aynaghar,” come up during the discussions at Bangabhaban?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: While I was at Bangabhaban, Hasan Nasir (Retired Brigadier General) called me. He informed me that several retired army officers and relatives of victims of enforced disappearances were gathered in front of the DGFI office. Their demand was that those still being held in secret detention facilities be released.
I raised the matter before the President. I said that family members of enforced disappearance victims and some of our officers were gathered outside the DGFI office. They wanted to know whether those detained in Aynaghar would be released.
The President expressed some surprise and asked whether a place called Aynaghar actually existed. I said, “Just as you do not know with certainty whether such a place exists, I also do not know for sure. However, the DGFI chief is present here. Let him speak.”
At that point, the Army Chief said that he would look into the matter and arrange for the release of anyone being held there. We later learned that arrangements were made to release the detainees the following day.
Was there any discussion at Bangabhaban about the structure of the next government or a national government? Were the student leaders present there?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: There was no detailed discussion in our presence about the structure of the next government, who would lead it, or who would be members of it. We were only told that an interim arrangement would be formed after discussions with everyone.
I do not recall any specific discussion using the term “national government.” However, there was an idea of forming an arrangement involving everyone. In that sense, it could be seen as an initial indication of a participatory government.
What was surprising was that the student leaders were not present during a large part of the discussion. I asked Asif Nazrul and Zonayed Saki where the student leaders were. They told me that the students were on their way.
Near the very end of the meeting, a young man and a young woman arrived. They later also gave statements to the media in front of Bangabhaban. However, I did not see the individuals who later emerged as the main leaders of the movement at that meeting. Why they were not present at the time, or when and where discussions about the structure of the future government took place, is something that did not happen in my presence.
We were only assured that the subsequent decisions would be made through discussions. We remained at Bangabhaban until around 9:30 pm.
Prothom Alo :
In the period following the uprising, there were also demands for the removal of the President.
Fazle Elahi Akbar: The Army Chief was abroad when demands for removing the President and scrapping the Constitution became stronger. One night, at around 9 pm, he called me and asked what BNP’s position was on the matter. He was concerned about what would happen if the President were removed and when the next election would be held.
At that time, Mirza Fakhrul was in Australia for medical treatment. I met with Begum Khaleda Zia and informed her about the matter. She said that the President’s effective powers were limited, and removing him could instead create constitutional uncertainty. She then asked Salahuddin Ahmed to communicate the party’s position to the relevant individuals.
The soldiers had just regained the love and trust of the people. They had seen that the public was welcoming them. If an attempt was made immediately afterward to restore the previous government, soldiers could have viewed it as a betrayal
Prothom Alo :
How significant was the role of retired military officers and their families in the July movement? Were the initiatives coordinated?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: In the history of Bangladesh’s movements, this was perhaps the first time that retired military officers and their family members played such a visible and significant role.
This was not only about retired officers. Many of their children, siblings, or close relatives are serving as military officers or personnel. When military families openly expressed solidarity with the movement, it undoubtedly influenced the mindset of young serving officers and soldiers.
In mid-July, the incident in which local Awami League leaders and activists and police attacked protesters after breaking through the gate of Mirpur DOHS, and residents there were also targeted, further united retired officers and their families. After that, discussions began in various DOHS areas. Retired officers and family members organised processions. On 4 August, senior retired officers held a press conference at the RAOWA Club.
These initiatives were not planned or strictly coordinated from any single center. The entire process was largely spontaneous. Discussions were taking place among families, friends, and various groups. Everyone’s concerns and expectations were almost the same. Everyone was saying: no more bloodshed; the army must not be used against the people.
I believe the participation of retired officers and their families acted as a catalyst in helping the army make the right decision. Young officers were regularly receiving feedback from their families and fellow soldiers. Unfortunately, the role of retired military officers and their families was not properly recognised in the July Declaration.
You previously said that you view the army as the center of stability in the country. Why do you think so?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: In a developing, densely populated, and politically divided country like ours, the army holds a special position. I am not saying that the army has never made mistakes. The army has also had many mistakes and controversial roles. Nevertheless, the majority of people in the country still respect this institution and look toward it during national crises.
However, this does not mean that the army should take power. After 1975, we repeatedly witnessed instability, coups, and counter-coups within the army. Once instability begins inside the force, it does not remain limited to a single incident; it creates further events and destabilizes the entire country.
For this reason, after 5 August, my primary concern was ensuring that no instability emerged within the army. From my position as someone associated with BNP, I tried as much as I could to help maintain stability. My goal was to ensure that an acceptable election could be held as quickly as possible without any conflict.
To me, the army was the center of the country’s stability. With that institution kept stable, power would need to be transferred to a political government through an election. If the election had failed, many more undesirable events could have taken place.
How do you assess the process through which Sheikh Hasina left the country? Was allowing her to leave the right decision?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I was not a direct witness to every part of the entire process. However, from the statement made by India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in their Parliament, it appears that Bangladesh made an official request and arrangements were made for Sheikh Hasina to travel to India within a very short period.
In that situation, I believe allowing her to leave was the most practical decision. If there had been further delays in making the decision, there could have been extensive bloodshed. People from all directions were moving toward Ganabhaban. If she had remained there and the situation had to be controlled, the army and the public would have ended up directly confronting each other.
Leaders of the Awami League, including Obaidul Quader, had previously said that if Sheikh Hasina’s government fell, hundreds of thousands of people would die. In the end, nothing like that happened. A much larger bloodshed was avoided. From that perspective, her swift departure was the better decision.
Between 5 and 8 August, particularly on 7 August, what was the role of the army? There have been reports that many things happened within the army at that time. Do you know anything about this?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I cannot say with certainty that it was a well-organised plan. I was also not a direct witness to the entire process. However, I received information that there was an attempt to reverse the decision taken by Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman on 5 August.
I had heard the name of the then Quartermaster General, Lieutenant General Md. Mujibur Rahman. He had previously served as the Director General of the Special Security Force (SSF). He had long-standing connections with the top levels of the previous government. However, I did not personally see him making any plans. I heard his name based on information I received from others.
I had known him for a long time. When I was Director of Military Operations, he served under me as a major. As a result, I had the opportunity to speak with him directly.
I also spoke several times with the then Director General of DGFI during that period. However, I am not saying with certainty that he was involved in the alleged initiative. My effort was to warn everyone with whom I was able to communicate about the possible consequences.
I told them, “Do not do anything like this. You did not witness 7 November 1975, I did.” My point was that if the public came to believe that a section of the army was attempting to bring back the ousted government with support from an external force, the reaction could be extremely severe. It would not be limited to resistance from ordinary people; it could also create a mutinous situation among army personnel.
The soldiers had just regained the love and trust of the people. They had seen that the public was welcoming them. If an attempt was made immediately afterward to restore the previous government, soldiers could have viewed it as a betrayal. I told those involved not to do anything that could put the lives of senior officers at risk at the hands of the very soldiers under their command.
Why did you compare the situation with November 7?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: At that time, I was a captain in the army. Between 3 and 7 November 1975, I witnessed from close range the shifts of power, counter-coups, and the reactions of soldiers within the army. A section of the public viewed Khaled Mosharraf’s initiative as being pro-India. That perception ultimately turned against his initiative and created circumstances in favour of Ziaur Rahman.
I had firsthand experience of how quickly a situation could spiral out of control if a decision by senior officers was not accepted by subordinate soldiers. After 5 August 2024, I also had information that the attitudes of young army officers and soldiers remained opposed to the previous government. Therefore, imposing any decision that went against their sentiments could have created conflict within the army itself.
Prothom Alo :
During the interim government period, tensions between the Chief Adviser’s Office and the military leadership came to the forefront. I would like to know your views on this matter.
Fazle Elahi Akbar: I do not want to take the side of any one party here. During that period, there were two important pillars of state administration, the Chief Adviser’s Office and the armed forces. It should be remembered that the decisions did not involve only the Army Chief; the Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force were also involved. The three service chiefs were officers from the same course. As a result, they had long-standing personal relationships and professional understanding. When they addressed the nation, they appeared together. The three service chiefs also went to Bangabhaban.
In an independent country, an open conflict between the government and the armed forces cannot be allowed to develop. That would be disastrous for the country. There were differences of opinion on some issues. There were also reports of differing positions between the government and the military leadership on several matters, including the issue of corridors. But our objective was to ensure that these differences did not turn into instability.
From BNP’s side, I tried as much as possible to prevent such instability. Because if a major incident had occurred within the army during the interim government period, it would not have remained confined to one place; it would have created further instability. Our goal was to move toward an acceptable election. Ultimately, because the election was held successfully, a major risk was avoided.
Prothom Alo :
After the mass uprising, people expected major changes in the state and governance system. To what extent have those expectations been fulfilled?
Fazle Elahi Akbar: People had high expectations. It is not possible to fulfill all expectations at once. If everything could be achieved, the world itself would become heaven. However, a democratic government has come to power, and it faces many challenges. Now we must see how the government addresses those challenges.
Regardless of which party engages in politics, the expectations of the people must be given importance. The party or government that can work most in line with the people’s aspirations will be the most successful.
People want a good, disciplined, and accountable government. One of Bangladesh’s biggest problems is corruption. Corruption has not only affected institutions; it has also become deeply embedded within society. In the past, a person who accepted bribes was viewed with shame and dishonor. Now, in many cases, people do not question the source of someone’s wealth; instead, wealth itself is considered a measure of respect. This is a major social decline.
If those who engage in wrongdoing and corruption are not properly held accountable, this decline will deepen further. For that, an independent and effective justice system and strong political commitment are necessary. The main conditions for fulfilling the aspirations of the mass uprising are the rule of law, accountability, and the government’s responsibility toward the people.
Thank you.
Fazle Elahi Akbar: Thank you as well.