A proposed legal framework for the local govt system

A modern legal framework for local government is essential for holding elections promptly. I believe it is necessary to review the draft laws proposed by the special committee led by Shawkat Ali in 2007 and the commission formed under both the current and previous interim governments, led by Tofail Ahmed, for reforming the local government system, and then formulate a final legal framework. Its theoretical foundation should be the “subsidiarity principle”, whose core idea is that where a problem exists, the most effective and sustainable opportunity for solving it also exists there.

In other words, issues that people face on a daily basis—such as education, healthcare, sanitation, the environment, and public safety—should be addressed under the leadership of their elected local government representatives. Therefore, union parishads, pourashavas, and city corporations should be the most important local government institutions and should be given the greatest share of resources, responsibilities, and authority. 

In our unitary system of governance, unlike a federal structure, zila parishads (district councils) are also important and can serve as an important mechanism for fiscal decentralisation and for financing local plans developed from the grassroots level. The role of upazilas may primarily be one of coordination.

The following issues should be included in the proposed legal framework:

Local government systems are generally divided into two categories: rural and urban local government. Union Parishads, Upazila Parishads, and District Councils fall under rural local government, while Pourashavas and City Corporations constitute urban local government.

According to the National Information Portal, Bangladesh currently has 4,599 unions, 495 upazilas, 64 districts, 331 pourashavas, and 13 city corporations. On average, therefore, each district has eight upazilas, each upazila has nine unions, and each district has five pourashavas (330/64). This existing structure of local government may be retained.

Following the recommendations of both the Shawkat Ali Committee and the Tofail Ahmed Commission, we also believe that two integrated laws should be enacted for the local government system—one for rural local government and another for urban local government. The integrated law for rural local government would have three sections: one dealing with district councils, another with upazila parishads, and a third with union parishads. Similarly, the integrated law for urban local government would contain separate sections for city corporations and pourashavas.

To comply with Article 59 of the Constitution, elections should be organised promptly at all administrative tiers. Under the existing structure, each union would consist of nine wards, with each ward having a population of 3,000 to 5,000 people. Thus, the total population of a union would range between 27,000 and 45,000. One member from each ward and one chairman from the entire union would be directly elected.

In addition to a directly elected Upazila Parishad chairman, each union would elect two representatives directly to the Upazila Parishad. Furthermore, the chairmen of all Union Parishads within the upazila would serve as ex officio members of the Upazila Parishad. As a result, the average membership of an Upazila Parishad would be 28 (18 elected members, nine ex officio members, and one chairman).

One councillor would be elected from each pourashava ward. In addition, each pourashava would have a mayor directly elected by the people. Thus, a pourashava would have 10 elected representatives.

However, the criteria for converting union areas into pourashavas should be made stricter, and areas that have been declared pourashavas despite not meeting the requirements of existing laws should have that status revoked based on the recommendations of the proposed Local Government Commission.

Bangladesh currently has 13 city corporations, and this number is likely to increase in the future. Each city corporation has a directly elected mayor. However, the number of councillors varies from one city corporation to another. The existing structure of city corporations may be retained.

At present, district council chairmen and members are elected indirectly by all elected representatives within the district rather than through direct public voting. Experience shows that because the electoral college is small, district council elections involve extensive vote-buying, severely undermining the integrity of the electoral process. To address this problem, the size of the electoral college should be significantly expanded. However, given the large geographical size of districts, direct election of district council chairmen would be impractical. Direct elections for other district council members, however, would be feasible.

To ensure direct representation, one district council member could be directly elected from each upazila and each pourashava. In addition, upazila and municipal chairmen would serve as ex officio members of the district council.

A district council chairman would continue to be elected indirectly. Alongside all elected local government representatives, additional members could also be included in the district council electoral college. It should be noted that spending limits must be established and strictly enforced for all elections.

The involvement of members of parliament (MPs) in local development activities or the provision of offices for them within Upazila Parishads is contrary to Articles 59 and 65 of the Constitution and constitutes a clear violation of the judgments in “Kudrat-e-Elahi v. Bangladesh” [44 DLR (AD) (1992)] and “Anwar Hossain v. Bangladesh” [16 BLT (HD) 2008]. 

The constitutional responsibilities of MPs are to enact laws, ensure transparency and accountability within the executive branch through parliamentary standing committees, approve budgets, and participate in policymaking. As MPs, Parliament is their workplace, and residential facilities have also been provided for them for that purpose. Therefore, the proposed local government law should keep MPs away from local development activities so that the kind of “MP-ocracy” witnessed in the past does not re-emerge.

Following the recommendation of the Shawkat Ali Committee, provisions for Ward Assemblies comprising all voters in a ward were incorporated into the Union Parishad Act, with the requirement that such assemblies be held twice a year.

Through Ward Assemblies, elected representatives are expected to ensure transparency and accountability to citizens, formulate local plans, and identify beneficiaries of government schemes on the basis of established criteria. Ward Assemblies are also intended to facilitate budget preparation based on local priorities and ensure transparency and accountability in implementation, although these objectives have not been realised in practice.

To ensure public participation, citizen committees may be formed at the municipal level. The zonal offices of city corporations should be made effective as instruments of decentralisation and public service delivery, and citizen committees should be established in every zone.

In accordance with constitutional directives, it is necessary to formulate and implement five-year development plans and annual development programmes (ADP) at every tier of local government with public participation. In this process, development can be turned into a social movement by engaging important community figures and local organisations, and by organising the people—an initiative previously undertaken by the BNP government. The allocation of the ADP will be based on these locally formulated development plans and programmes.

To ensure institutional accountability and transparency of public representatives, it is necessary to regularly monitor and inspect the activities of each local government institution. At the same time, audit systems, including financial management, must be strengthened. In addition, elected chairmen or mayors, members or councillors, and chairpersons or members of standing committees will be jointly accountable to the council. For this purpose, council meetings should be held monthly, and the number of standing committees should be reduced and made more effective.

The capacity of local government institutions depends on the training of elected representatives and institutional officials and employees. To ensure proper and continuous training activities, the National Institute of Local Government (NILG) must be provided with adequate funding and manpower, and its autonomy must be ensured. It is also necessary to modernise its training programmes and strengthen its research activities.

There is a constitutional directive to establish a “government” in each administrative unit, which will be responsible for local governance, and the “administration and civil service functions” are included within the responsibilities of these institutions. This means that just as at the central level all officials and employees serve under the government led by the Prime Minister, similarly at the local level all government officials and employees are expected, in accordance with the Constitution, to perform their duties under the elected representatives of local government.

Furthermore, if local government institutions are to plan and implement all constitutionally mandated public services and economic development activities, there is no alternative to placing all line ministry personnel under local government institutions. As part of this change, the introduction of a separate “Local Government Service” should be considered. In this context, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in the Kudrat-e-Elahi case, clearly directed that Parliament cannot ignore constitutional provisions while legislating on local government matters.

According to the Constitution, in our unitary system of governance, local government is supposed to function as an autonomous system parallel to the central government. However, in reality, the opposite has occurred. The local government system has become an extended arm of the central government controlled by the bureaucracy.

Historically as well, central government directives and control have dominated local government institutions, preventing them from developing and from effectively serving the public welfare. This situation must be changed.

In order to enhance the financial capacity of local government institutions, the Shawkat Ali Commission in 2007 proposed a draft law recommending a body that would assess their financial needs and make recommendations to the government, as well as address undue political and bureaucratic interference and ensure proper and impartial evaluation of these institutions.

One of the central objectives of the proposed commission was to promote decentralisation, especially fiscal decentralisation, in which district councils were expected to play an important role.

The draft law was issued as an ordinance and a statutory body called the Permanent Local Government Commission was also formed as a three-member institution with a five-year term. However, as Parliament did not approve the ordinance, the commission was dissolved. The re-establishment of this commission should therefore be considered seriously.

In the first session of the 13th Parliament, a law was passed to prohibit the use of party symbols in local government elections. However, before the session ended, some political parties announced their candidates for city corporation elections. Similarly, some parties are attempting to field single candidates in local elections.

Even if party symbols are not used, announcing party-backed candidates or fielding single candidates would undermine the fundamental intent of the law, even if it is formally complied with, and would be entirely contrary to the rule of law. It is hoped that political parties will not return to a culture of non-compliance with laws.

* Badiul Alam Majumdar, Secretary, Sushashoner Jonno Nagorik (SHUJAN)

* The views expressed are those of the author.