Politics and reform: Procedural crisis versus deficit of trust

During the tenure of the interim government, a total of 133 ordinances were promulgated over a period of 18 months. Following scrutiny by a special committee, the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) approved 113 of these. Of the remaining 20 ordinances, four were repealed (including one that was repealed and subsequently re-promulgated), while 16 were not tabled in Parliament as bills. These 16 ordinances have since been recommended for further review, with a view to strengthening them and reintroducing them as new bills.

As a consequence, the legal validity of 20 ordinances issued during the interim government’s tenure has effectively lapsed. These include one related to the appointment of Supreme Court judges, two concerning the Supreme Court Secretariat, three relating to the National Human Rights Commission, two addressing enforced disappearances, and one pertaining to the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Under Article 93(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, an ordinance must be placed before Parliament within 30 days of the commencement of a parliamentary session and must be approved within that timeframe. Failing this, or if Parliament declines to approve it, the ordinance ceases to have effect. Accordingly, as these ordinances were not tabled in Parliament, they lost their legal force after 10 April. Some have already been formally annulled through parliamentary voting.

Against this backdrop, a number of critical questions have emerged in the public mind. Is the majority in Parliament pushing the ruling party towards unilateralism? Are political parties adequately comprehending public expectations? Is the much-discussed July National Charter, hailed as a symbol of reform and change, already losing momentum even before implementation? Beyond these questions, the repeal or suspension of ordinances warrants deeper analysis.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has consistently maintained that it does not oppose reform per se; rather, its objection lies with the manner in which reforms are being implemented. In practice, many reform initiatives undertaken during the interim government’s tenure have exhibited procedural weaknesses and generated controversy.

For instance, under the July Charter, there was an initiative to secure approval for 84 reform proposals through a referendum framed around just four questions. This attempt to compress complex and multidimensional reforms into such a simplified format was not widely accepted, not only by political parties but also by segments of civil society. The BNP formally recorded “notes of dissent” on several occasions. From the outset, the party has stated that, if in power, it would implement reforms in accordance with its electoral manifesto and through established parliamentary procedures. Its position, therefore, is not anti-reform but rather pro-transparency and procedural legitimacy.

During the interim government’s tenure, ordinances were often promulgated in haste—on average, in less than five days per ordinance—without comprehensive parliamentary debate, public consultation, or meaningful dialogue with political stakeholders. Consequently, objections from the BNP and other parties have persisted.

For example, in the ordinance on the appointment of Supreme Court judges, the proposed “Supreme Judicial Appointment Council” limited government representation, prompting objections from the Ministry of Law. If judicial independence is to be ensured, it must rest on parliamentary oversight and constitutional balance—not on decrees issued by an unelected authority.

Similarly, the two ordinances concerning the Supreme Court Secretariat risk increasing bureaucratic complexity under the guise of administrative autonomy. Questions also remain as to whether increasing the number of commissioners under the Anti-Corruption Commission ordinance would genuinely enhance effectiveness or merely create avenues for political accommodation. The two ordinances on enforced disappearances have raised concerns regarding their practical viability, as they were introduced without adequate alignment with international conventions. Comparable procedural shortcomings are also evident in the three ordinances relating to the National Human Rights Commission.

Political scientists have long identified central reasons why reform processes fail: excessive ambition, disregard for local context, bureaucratic overreach, and a lack of political will. Recent experiences in Bangladesh reflect many of these dynamics.

Several reform initiatives undertaken by the interim government were not fully aligned with local realities. For instance, certain provisions within the Human Rights Commission ordinances could have generated new forms of contention within Bangladesh’s socio-cultural context. In other cases, there appeared to be a tendency to expand bureaucratic authority. Furthermore, the omission of important recommendations in revised ordinances raised doubts about the effectiveness of the institutions concerned.

The BNP government’s argument, however, is relatively straightforward: as the interim government was unelected, treating its ordinances as binding “decrees” runs counter to the principles of parliamentary democracy. The party supports the implementation of the July Charter, but insists that this should occur through parliamentary deliberation and a two-thirds majority, in accordance with Article 142 of the Constitution.

Moreover, given that a referendum has already been held, the referendum ordinance itself has effectively served its purpose and is no longer necessary. BNP leaders, including Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, have repeatedly stated, “We will implement the July Charter in full, but with notes of dissent and through parliamentary procedures.”

This stance should not necessarily be interpreted as reluctance towards reform; rather, it may be seen as an effort to render the reform process constitutional, sustainable, and grounded in public ownership.

However, the core challenge lies elsewhere. A significant segment of the public does not fully grasp the intricacies of procedural debates; instead, they judge outcomes. As a result, the message reaching the public is not particularly favourable for the BNP.

Many perceive the party as being “anti-reform” or as retreating from its July commitments. Opposition groups have been capitalising on this perception, successfully promoting narratives—particularly through social media—that portray the BNP as resistant to reform.

This narrative is gradually shaping public opinion and may heighten the risk of future political instability. Compounding this are global economic pressures, energy shortages, and domestic economic challenges. Together, these factors are fuelling public dissatisfaction—an element that can be readily politicised.

In the current context, the BNP faces multiple pressures. On the one hand, there is international scrutiny to uphold standards of human rights and good governance; on the other, there are pressing domestic economic challenges and rising public expectations. Balancing these is not an easy task.

In this context, several factors are important for the BNP; first, the party must clearly communicate to the public why certain ordinances or proposals have been repealed. This explanation must go beyond political positioning and be framed as a principled stance. For instance, in repealing the ordinance on judicial appointments, it could emphasise that judicial independence will be more robustly ensured through parliamentary processes, preventing the concentration of power in unelected hands.

Similarly, the ordinances concerning the Anti-Corruption Commission and enforced disappearances should be revisited, strengthened, and reintroduced as comprehensive bills to ensure genuine effectiveness in combating corruption and safeguarding human rights. Regarding the referendum ordinance, the BNP’s position is clear: implementation of the July Charter should proceed through institutionalised democratic processes, enriched by parliamentary debate.

Second, the party must strengthen grassroots engagement to rebuild trust with the public. It should actively counter the “anti-reform” narrative circulating on social media by presenting a coherent counter-narrative.

The BNP’s 31-point framework for state restructuring, its commitment to implementing the July Charter with notes of dissent, and its electoral manifesto must be clearly communicated to the public, including through grassroots mobilisation.

Third, international partners must be reassured that the party remains committed to implementing effective and credible reforms, albeit grounded in local realities.

The BNP must uphold its commitments to human rights, anti-corruption measures, and judicial independence in line with international standards, ensuring that Bangladesh’s economic partnerships and global standing are not undermined. Continued dialogue with political parties and civil society is also essential.

Fourth, the government must take visible steps to address immediate public concerns—particularly energy shortages, inflation, and employment. Public trust is closely tied to improvements in everyday living conditions. Reforms that exacerbate public hardship will prove politically counterproductive.

Fifth, the government should revisit the 16 ordinances, refine them through inclusive consultation, and reintroduce them as robust and realistic bills in Parliament. This process must incorporate grassroots perspectives, expert input, political dialogue, recommendations from national consensus bodies, and international standards. Such an approach would make the reform process more inclusive and sustainable.

The controversy surrounding the repeal of ordinances has brought into sharp focus a fundamental truth: it is not only what reforms are undertaken that matters, but how they are carried out is even more critical. Without procedural transparency and inclusive participation, even the most well-intentioned initiatives risk descending into a crisis of public trust.

At this juncture, the greatest challenge is not merely to sustain reform, but to ensure that it is anchored in public ownership, constitutional legitimacy, and long-term sustainability. Failing this, a procedural crisis may ultimately evolve into a deeper crisis of trust.

* Nurul Huda Sakib, President and Professor, Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University

* Md Ekramul Haque, Lecturer, Department of Government and Politics, Asian University of Bangladesh

* The views expressed are those of the authors.