How govt will manage sky-high reform expectations 

A student-led mass uprising ousted the Awami League government on 5 August and its prime minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India. Within days, the interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, took the charge. 

Since then, the interim government undertook reform measures in various sectors, including corruption prevention, political, administrative, electoral spheres. 

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank focused on preventing wars and shaping policies for a more peaceful world, noted that it will not be an easy task for the interim government to implement the reform plans. Against the backdrop, it presented a set of recommendations regarding the situation in Bangladesh. 

A key challenge for the interim government will be to manage sky-high public expectations. Given the constraints on Dr Yunus and his allies – including their lack of governing experience, the pent-up grievances in Bangladeshi society and the country’s fractious politics – it will most likely be impossible for them to deliver entirely on their ambitious agenda.

Nevertheless, the country has a rare opportunity for political, economic and social renewal. The atrocities of July and August have created a “never again” moment: a desire to put in place guardrails sturdy enough to prevent another autocrat from emerging. 

To achieve this goal, the government will need to amend laws and the constitution; reform the election commission and electoral system; and make changes within the police and bureaucracy, given the centrality of these institutions to holding free and fair elections. As an interim government figure put it, “If we don’t repair our institutions, there won’t be free and fair elections or a smooth transition, so what will be the point of all this?”

On 11 September, Dr Yunus formed six commissions to spearhead these reforms. Headed by respected civil society leaders and former bureaucrats, each of these bodies will handle a key area: the judiciary, the electoral system, state administration, the police, corruption and the constitution. The commissions began work on 1 October and will report back by the end of the year; the interim government will then hold talks with political parties and undertake public consultations to complete plans for reforms in these six areas.

It has since announced four additional reform commissions, focused on health, media, labour rights and women’s affairs. The commissions have nonetheless been criticised for their lack of inclusivity, particularly with regard to women and minorities.

Perhaps the most difficult of all reforms will be to overhaul Bangladesh’s institutions. During her fifteen years in power, Sheikh Hasina worked assiduously to undermine their independence so that they would do her bidding. She typically did so by stacking them with supporters, showering them with largesse or cowing their senior officials. 

Already, the interim government has replaced several senior and mid-level members of key institutions, particularly in the judiciary, bureaucracy and police. Many officials close to the AL remain in place, however. A full clean-out is impractical, and the government wants to give all those who remain a chance to get behind the reform agenda.

The judicial system of Bangladesh has never been entirely safe from political interference, but under Hasina the meddling assumed alarming proportions as her administration used the courts to cudgel her political opponents. 

In 2017, the chief justice himself was pressured to resign after the Supreme Court he headed ruled that parliament could not sack judges; facing serious threats to his safety, he later fled the country and was convicted in absentia of seemingly bogus corruption charges. By going after the country’s top judge, Hasina sent a clear signal that any member of the judiciary who defied her would face dire consequences. 

Over her last decade in power, the legal system got clogged with hundreds of thousands – by some estimates, millions – of cases filed against regime opponents, including Dr Yunus himself. The charges were often based on flimsy or even non-existent evidence, but judges were loath to dismiss cases for fear of retribution.

The interim government has already taken several steps to restore the judiciary’s independence. Under pressure from student demonstrators, the former chief justice resigned shortly after Hasina fled, with a respected jurist, Syed Refaat Ahmed, taking the job. Unjust cases filed against protest leaders in July and August are being dropped; earlier charges against opposition figures are also expected to be withdrawn gradually. 

On 21 September, the new chief justice outlined judicial reforms aimed at addressing the “crisis of public trust”. His main plan is to abolish the executive’s control of promotion and transfer of judges, creating instead a separate secretariat under the Supreme Court to select the most capable jurists. In the meantime, the interim government has transferred and promoted more than 300 lower court judges. A senior judge told Crisis Group that his colleagues already feel a new freedom. “The biggest change is the level of politicisation and pressure that we faced before – nothing like that is happening now”, he said.

The interim government faces a similar challenge – and has adopted a similar approach – in restoring an efficient, impartial bureaucracy. The task is immense, given the size of the civil service. The interim government has already appointed dozens of new high-level officials, while terminating those deemed close to the AL and reinstating several civil servants who had been forced into retirement. 

It announced 400 promotions in three batches in August, and it has replaced almost all the 64 deputy commissioners, a powerful position in the civil service. In mid-August, the government also dismissed more than 850 elected leaders of local governance bodies – many of whom had fled after Hasina’s fall – and appointed administrators in their place. The process has hardly been seamless, with some of those overlooked for promotion protesting the appointments.

The bureaucracy is not just politicised, though; it is also highly inefficient. The quota system has deprived it of many good recruits, while both large-scale and petty corruption, already commonplace, got worse under Hasina. “One of the main challenges for the interim government is to use the existing bureaucracy, which is very inefficient, to get some results, to push through vital reforms”, acknowledged an interim government official.

Perhaps the biggest challenge when it comes to reforming institutions will be dealing with the security agencies, particularly the police force. Crisis Group flagged police reform as an important task when Hasina came to power in 2009; even then, the police were “a tool of political control and a source of patronage”. Her subsequent reign made matters worse: in the words of an interim government official, she turned the force into her “attack dogs”. 

Over the years, the force was stacked with AL supporters, particularly members of the party’s thuggish student wing, the Chhatra League. Hasina’s reliance on the police to keep her in power was evident during the July-August protests, when they unleashed deadly violence to break up demonstrations that started out being largely peaceful.

As noted above, the government’s first priority has been to restore law and order. As many police officers deserted their posts for fear of retribution, the interim government on 17 September granted the army magistracy powers for two months. During this period, army officers have the authority to do things like issue arrest orders, execute search warrants and disperse unlawful assemblies. The decision has roused controversy, but the interim government has defended it as necessary to counter “subversive acts”.

The interim administration knows that, if the public thinks it cannot ensure a basic level of stability, it will lose support, affording its opponents an opportunity to push for an early election. There is also widespread concern that AL cadres are fomenting violence as part of an attempt to bring the interim government down. Such an effort would be unlikely to succeed, but it would nonetheless risk weakening the interim government. “It’s a sideshow, but the intent is there”, commented a student leader.

Police have gradually returned to duty, and the government has replaced senior officers implicated in abuses under Hasina’s regime.

Police have gradually returned to duty, and the government has replaced senior officers implicated in abuses under Hasina’s regime. These measures alone are unlikely to be sufficient, however. Trust in the police remains low and morale is poor, with officers worried about being attacked or charged for their role in the crackdown on protesters under Hasina’s regime. 

A mid-level officer said little had changed inside the force, adding that personnel are upset that the government has taken no action against those responsible for killing police officers in the aftermath of Hasina’s flight. “Protesters hanged our officers in the streets”, he said. “Who asked for justice for the police who were murdered? No one”.

The officer said the ways government leaders have traditionally treated the police would need to change, too. “Governments need to realise that we are not political party cadres. ... Their habit of using us for their interest damaged our professionalism”. Deeper reforms will likely have to wait until the newly formed police commission reports back toward the end of 2024. 

Reform of other security agencies is likely to prove even more challenging, in part because they are under military command or include army officers. With the interim government dependent on the army for support, Dr Yunus can ill afford to upset its members. 

The Rapid Action Battalion, an elite crimefighting force whose widespread human rights violations led the US to sanction several of its senior officers, comprises representatives of the military’s three branches, as well as the police and two paramilitary forces, Border Guard Bangladesh and Ansar. 

The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the military intelligence service, has also been implicated in a range of alleged abuses, from enforced disappearances to bank takeovers. While the army chief has replaced the heads of these agencies and forced several former officials into retirement – some have even been arrested – there has been little public discussion so far about how to prevent further abuses.

There is a consensus among political forces backing the interim government that constitutional safeguards are necessary to enshrine democracy and prevent another autocrat from hijacking the state apparatus. Reforms are likely to focus on strengthening checks and balances on the executive, in part by building up the prerogatives of other institutions, particularly the judiciary and parliament. 

The combination of Bangladesh’s first-past-the-post voting system, a unicameral legislature based on the Westminster system, huge authority vested in the government-appointed chief justice and constitutional restrictions on lawmakers opposing their own party has created an environment in which the prime minister wields nearly all powers. For the sake of fair elections, many also think the country should return to the caretaker government model that served it reasonably well for two decades, before Hasina scrapped the constitutional provision in 2011. 

The main point of debate on constitutional reform – and a looming fault line – is whether the charter should be amended or entirely rewritten. Within the government, and among several influential jurists, the dominant view seems to be that rewriting the constitution would be time-consuming and politically divisive, as it would presumably require a constituent assembly. 

But many student leaders favour a new constitution, arguing that the present charter, enacted in 1972 and amended seventeen times, has been used to oppress the people of Bangladesh. “We … want to radically transform the state mechanism so no party or political ideology can ever become a monster again”, one said. “The interim government needs to heed that desire, because their mandate is from an uprising, not a ballot box”.

Whichever approach is taken, no authority is likely to pursue constitutional reform until after an election, particularly given the doubts about whether the interim government itself is constitutional.

Under Hasina, Bangladesh’s economy unquestionably grew, but the macro-economic indicators the government published were highly misleading. It was an open secret that Hasina’s administration was manipulating key economic data for much of its time in office. 

The World Bank has estimated that from 2015 to 2019 about half of Bangladesh’s reported gross domestic product growth was “unexplained”, in that it could not be attributed to structural improvements or the effects of earlier reforms. In other words, the numbers were cooked, though to what extent remains unclear. “It was rubber-and-pencil growth”, an economist observed. Export statistics were also doctored; in early July, Bangladesh Bank said export figures for the previous fiscal year alone had likely been inflated by $10 billion. 

Corruption also worsened under Hasina’s government, particularly in the banking sector, and became a major source of resentment. More than $100 billion are thought to have been moved offshore illegally over the past fifteen years. Industrial-scale looting by ruling-party acolytes has left some of the country’s biggest private banks insolvent, according to regulators, putting depositors’ money at risk. “It’s a classic case of crony capitalism”, a foreign economist said. “The amount of embezzlement that the country has faced, particularly in the financial sector, is extraordinary”.

Despite popular grievances over economic hardship, long-term economic reform is a lesser priority for the interim government than political change. Its view is that addressing fundamental economic problems, such as low tax revenues, will take years – far longer than the interim government’s likely lifespan – whereas political reforms to improve governance can be taken more swiftly and lead to better economic decision-making. 

Nevertheless, to get a clearer picture of where the country stands, the interim government has formed a committee to write a white paper on the state of the economy. The team will also review contracts signed by the previous government, including some large-scale infrastructure projects developed without competitive bidding.

In the meantime, the interim government is focused on short-term macro-economic priorities, such as maintaining stability, building up foreign currency reserves and bringing down inflation. When Dr Yunus came to office, foreign reserves were falling precipitously, and food prices were rising at close to 15 per cent. Power outages were increasing, and the government owed more than $1 billion to Indian electricity providers. The protests and political uncertainty had also disrupted the ready-made garment sector, which generates around 85 per cent of the country’s export revenues and is a major source of employment for women, in particular. 

The early signs suggest that policymakers can avoid a Sri Lanka-style economic crash that brings down the government. The interim government has secured billions of dollars of additional financial support from multilateral financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Exchange rate reforms have helped boost foreign reserves. Inflation, while still high, has declined from its July peak, and Dhaka has started to clear its debt in the power sector; it is also seeking to renegotiate terms with some of its external creditors, including Russia and China.

To clean up the mess in the banking sector and restore public confidence, the government has appointed a respected former IMF official to head the Bangladesh Bank. The central bank has reconstituted the boards of underperforming banks and increased the level of deposit insurance; deposits have since risen, according to regulators. Authorities have also started trying to recover some of the bank assets that were moved offshore. 

Nevertheless, serious economic risks remain, particularly given the state of the financial sector, the impact of unrest on the garment industry – foreign brands have moved many orders to other countries – and persistent high inflation. The latter is an acute concern given the effect that high prices could have on the interim government’s popularity. “The biggest concern beyond the financial sector is high inflation”, said an economist. “Everyone here is petrified about this”.

Justice and accountability

The interim government has regularly highlighted the need for accountability for past atrocities, particularly those committed during July-August. In that regard, it is expected to seek Hasina’s extradition from India under a treaty with New Delhi; Yunus has stated publicly that Hasina “has to be brought back, or the people of Bangladesh won’t be at peace”.

Whether India, which staunchly supported the Hasina government until the very end, would accede to such a request remains uncertain. For now, Dr Yunus has sought the UN’s help in conducting an independent investigation. After an exploratory visit in late August, the UN Human Rights Office sent an eight-member team to Bangladesh in mid-September to collect evidence of abuses committed between 1 July and 15 August. The investigation has largely been completed and the evidence is now being analysed. 

That atrocities were committed is uncontroversial, but once the investigation is complete, the interim government will face difficult decisions about how to proceed. It has several options, starting with the domestic International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) that Hasina established in 2010 to try alleged war criminals. Another would be a hybrid local-international mechanism. Interim government officials say they may also develop a truth and reconciliation process for those accused of lesser crimes.

There is intense debate within the Yunus administration as to the most appropriate venue for seeking justice. One source close to the government said most advisers want a degree of international involvement and recognise that the ICT, in its current form at least, has little legitimacy. “They know this is a kangaroo court. If you use it to target Hasina some people will be happy, but it could damage the country’s international image”, the source said.

Likewise, it may be difficult to avert the perception that prosecution of high-level crimes is free of partisan political influence. This risk appears to have risen following the appointment of prosecutors linked to Jamaat-e-Islami, many of whose former leaders were executed after trials at the ICT. “It’s really important to make sure people don’t see it as just tit-for-tat”, agreed a legal expert. “Some international involvement could be important, like having a foreign judge”. 

In the meantime, a messy legal process is playing out through local police stations and courts. Under Bangladeshi law, police have an obligation to accept criminal complaints from members of the public, and there are few limits on who can be named in these complaints. For serious offences, police can arrest the accused without a warrant – a power that has been widely misused in the past, particularly to target the political opposition. 

Hundreds of people connected to Hasina’s administration, including ministers and parliamentarians, have already been arrested on alleged links to the July-August violence, despite often not being present when the alleged incidents occurred. Judges hearing the cases have remanded most of them to custody. As of late September, more than 200 cases of murder and attempted murder had been filed against Hasina alone; many senior officials from her administration are facing similar charges.

The process is open to abuse, and allegations have surfaced that it is being used to settle political scores well beyond the elite. Some complaints list hundreds of defendants, many of them unidentified. In one case, a lawyer who had criticised the interim government on Facebook was named in a murder complaint filed with police, despite the complainant apparently having no idea who he is; the complaint was reportedly prepared with the help of lawyers from the BNP and Jamaat. “Lots of people named in these cases have no connection to the incident”, said a legal expert involved in the process. “It’s causing fear and anxiety. ... People think they are going to be arrested any minute”. While these cases are widely seen as flawed, the interim government has no power to block them without first abrogating legal rights and practices that were established during the colonial period and have become ingrained.