What is the political future of Awami League?

On 24 May 2025, I wrote a column in Prothom Alo on how likely is the return of the deposed autocrat. Drawing on the study ''The Post-Exile Fate of Leaders: A New Dataset'' by Osaka University researchers Masanori Kubota, Kaoru Hidaka, and Taku Yukawa, I sought to show that among the 91 autocratic leaders who went into exile between 1970 and 2014, only 19 per cent managed to return to their countries and become heads of state again. Those who did return had spent an average of 6.6 years in exile.

A year later, that discussion has resurfaced in Bangladesh. This time, however, the issue is not centered on a single individual but on the political future of the Awami League. Supporters' flash rallies in different places, new campaigns on social media, and discussions on television talk shows have all brought the same question back into focus: Can Awami League, whose activities remain banned, return to Bangladesh's political arena?
Is the interim government's failure enough?

Comparative political research clearly shows that a deposed political party is less likely to return to power through its own strength than through the weaknesses of the governments that succeed it.

Following the mass uprising of 2024, the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus assumed office. At the time, public expectations were high. People hoped that law and order would improve quickly, the administration would begin functioning normally, the economy would stabilise, and the prolonged political crisis would come to an end.

The reality, however, proved far more difficult. Protests over a range of issues, some well-founded, others less so, along with attacks on and vandalism of various institutions, mob violence, administrative weakness, economic uncertainty, and allegations of abuse of power all contributed to growing public disappointment. It was in this context that some people began saying, "Things were better before."

Recent comparative political research describes this phenomenon as "political nostalgia." In other words, when a new government fails to meet public expectations, many people begin to view the previous government more favourably than the current one.

This is where some observers make a significant mistake. They assume that once people start expressing such sentiments, the return of Awami League becomes only a matter of time. The research findings, however, negate such perceptions.

Canadian political scientists James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, in their book ''Life After Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide,'' argue that while the failure of a new government can create an opportunity for a deposed ruling party, it never guarantees that party''s return to power.

If a segment of the Bangladeshi public has become disillusioned during the tenure of the interim government, that is part of the country''s political reality. But does such disappointment automatically translate into support for Awami League?

Some believe that if Sheikh Hasina returns to Bangladesh, Awami League will regain its strength. Same say the party has no future without her. International research, however, suggests that the issue is not so straightforward. According to political scientists James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, no political party can endure over the long term by relying solely on a single leader. To regain public trust, a party must learn from its past mistakes, present a new message, and convince voters that it has genuinely changed.

In Bangladesh's case, however, one important point must be kept in mind. It would be mistaken to assume that the political experiences of Europe, Africa, or Latin America apply directly to Bangladesh. Politics in South Asia is shaped to a considerable extent by personalities, political families, and emotional loyalties. In countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, political dynasties have played significant roles for decades. As a result, Bangladesh's political landscape cannot be fully explained through Western political theories alone.

It is also true that no political party can sustain itself over the long term solely on the basis of a family legacy or the popularity of a single leader. India's National Congress is a prime example. Despite the legacy of the Nehru-Gandhi family, the party has not been able to regain its former position.

Similarly, the return of the Marcos family in the Philippines was not due to family name alone. It also depended on rebuilding the party organisation, adopting new political strategies, and making a concerted effort to regain public trust.

Political science research reaches the same conclusion. In ''Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America,'' political scientists Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully argue that a political party's long-term success depends less on the popularity of a single leader than on the degree to which the party is institutionally strong and well institutionalised.
The same question applies to Bangladesh. The issue is not simply about Sheikh Hasina. The real question is whether Awami League can adapt to the country's new political realities. Can it learn from its past mistakes and develop a new generation of leadership? Or will it continue to rely primarily on memories of its past popularity? The answers to these questions will determine the party's future.

Any discussion of Awami League's future also raises another question: under the current political circumstances, could Awami League one day reach an understanding or accommodation with any of its present-day rivals?

To many, the question may seem unrealistic. Yet political history has repeatedly produced outcomes that once appeared unimaginable.
Bangladesh's own political history provides a striking example. After independence, relations between the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and Awami League were marked by intense conflict. JSD's role in the political developments of 1975 remains the subject of debate to this day. Yet in later years, a faction of JSD (now JASAD) forged a political understanding with Awami League, joined it in political movements, and even became part of the government.

Likewise, during the anti-Ershad movement of the 1990s, Awami League and Jamaat-e-Islami campaigned on various issues while pursuing the same immediate political objective. Later, in the run-up to the 1996 election, political circumstances also gave rise understanding between them.

In other words, Bangladesh's history demonstrates that the notion of permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics does not always correspond to political reality.

Research in comparative politics points to the same conclusion. In ''The Theory of Political Coalitions,'' political scientist William Riker, and in ''A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties,'' political scientist Kaare Strøm, argue that political parties do not form alliances solely on the basis of ideological affinity. Prospects for future power, electoral calculations, parliamentary dynamics, and strategic necessity often play equally important roles in coalition-building.

In light of these theoretical perspectives, it is reasonable to ask whether the Awami League could ever reach some form of political understanding with Jamaat-e-Islami or the National Citizen Party (NCP). Or even with Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)?

It is impossible to answer that question at present. The outcome will depend not only on decisions made by party leaders but, perhaps more importantly, on whether such a move would be acceptable to grassroots supporters.

For Awami League, the mass uprising of 2024 was not merely a political defeat; it was also a profound psychological shock for thousands of its leaders and activists. Many party members have fled the country, gone into hiding, faced criminal cases, or found themselves socially isolated. For many, these experiences are not only political but deeply personal.
As a result, even if Awami League's top leadership were to consider a new political accommodation for strategic reasons in the future, an important question would remain: how readily would the party's grassroots members accept such a decision?

The same question applies to the other political parties as well. If NCP builds its political identity around the legacy of the 2024 mass uprising, would its leaders and activists be willing to accept an accommodation with Awami League? Jamaat-e-Islami has long been one of Awami League's fiercest political critics; would its members readily accept such an arrangement? The same questions would arise with respect to any understanding between the Awami League and BNP. At present, there is no way of knowing the answers.

Political history, both in Bangladesh and abroad, shows that long-standing political adversaries have at times worked together out of necessity. For that reason, the possibility of some form of accommodation between Awami League and Jamaat, NCP, or BNP cannot be dismissed as impossible. At the same time, it would be equally incorrect to regard such an outcome as inevitable.

The next question is: on whom does Awami League''s future depend most?
Many would probably answer: on Awami League itself. International research, however, suggests that the answer is not quite so simple. In ''Retrospective Voting in American National Elections,'' American political scientist Morris Fiorina argues that, in the end, voters judge not past governments but the government currently in power.

Bangladesh is no exception. If a BNP-led government argues that the country's problems are solely the fault of Awami League and the interim government, the public may accept that explanation for a time. Over time, however, people will evaluate the incumbent government on the basis of its own performance, its governance, economic management, maintenance of law and order, efforts to combat corruption, and commitment to democratic norms. Herein lies the greatest clue to Awami League's possible return.

Another important question is how Awami League should be dealt with. One principle should be kept in mind: in a democratic state, it is not the government''s role to preserve or eliminate any political party, but to uphold the rule of law. The courts are responsible for judging crimes, while the people decide the outcome of political competition. Allegations of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and other crimes committed during the Awami League's time in power must certainly be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted. Conflating criminal accountability with political competition ultimately puts democracy itself at risk.

For that reason, relying solely on administrative measures to suppress the Awami League's political activities could prove counterproductive in the long run. International experience suggests that when political parties are excluded from the political arena, they often seek to portray themselves as victims of persecution in order to generate public sympathy.

Finally, let us return to the central question: Can Awami League return to Bangladesh's political arena? At present, no one knows the answer. History shows, however, that no political party survives solely on its own strength, nor does it return to power merely because of its opponents' weaknesses. In the end, a party's future is determined by public support, its ability to adapt and change, its commitment to good governance, and the dynamics of democratic competition.

* Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is a teacher and researcher in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at North South University.
* The views expressed are those of the author.

* This article appeared in Prothom Alo print and online and has been translated by Ayesha Kabir for Prothom Alo English Online.