Fulfilling people’s aspirations a big challenge for interim govt

A student-led mass uprising ousted the Awami League government on 5 August and its prime minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India. Within days, the interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, took the charge. 

Since then, the interim government undertook reform measures in various sectors, including corruption prevention, political, administrative, electoral spheres. 

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank focused on preventing wars and shaping policies for a more peaceful world, noted that it will not be an easy task for the interim government to implement the reform plans. Against the backdrop, it presented a set of recommendations regarding the situation in Bangladesh. 

In the wake of Hasina’s fall, the interim government has a unique opportunity to pursue political reform. But the pitfalls are many. To have any chance of seeing through its reform agenda, Dr Yunus will need to maintain a degree of political consensus and keep divisions in check. To this end, he has held regular meetings with political parties, both collectively and separately, to seek their input and keep them apprised of his plans. 

As a government insider noted, “Right now, everything is possible, provided the political forces  have the patience to wait for that reform process to take place. That is a big, big question, though. I don’t trust them to have the appetite for reform.”

With the Awami League (AL) largely out of play, the most potent threat is the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), because of its formidable grassroots network. The party, which is trying to change public perceptions of it as little better than the AL, has issued strong statements of support for the interim government, saying it is willing to give Yunus and his colleagues time to make reforms. 

BNP leaders have taken commendable steps to limit retributive violence by the party rank and file and to expel members involved in extortion. The party will also make recommendations to the reform commissions. A senior BNP leader told Crisis Group that the party recognised politics in Bangladesh had drastically changed. “There is a trust deficit, and we need to win back [the public’s] confidence”, he said. “Ultimately, that will be a good thing for the country”.

But precisely how much time the BNP will be willing to give Yunus is unclear, as senior officials have made differing statements. Party leaders also seem to be struggling to control the party’s grassroots supporters, many of whom are keen to embark on an election campaign. If the BNP leadership loses patience, the party could agitate for an early poll, which it would likely win. 

With its large following, it likely has the capacity to make the country ungovernable – a tactic regularly deployed in the past by both the BNP and the AL to force demands on governments.

There are already signs the party could ramp up pressure. On 17 September, thousands of BNP supporters gathered in Dhaka to call for an election, and further rallies took place. That said, the risks of such an outcome should not be exaggerated. As the largest opposition party, the BNP is entitled to act as a check on the interim government. Yet it is also in the party’s interest to work with Yunus, lest the younger generation of voters already disillusioned with the country’s traditional parties come to see it as a spoiler.

Countervailing the BNP are the interim government’s two main backers, students and the army. The former emerged from the July-August protests as a potent political force, even if they have not (yet) coalesced into a political party. Their interests align closely with the interim government’s, in that they want it to stay in power for an extended period and carry out deep reforms, but keeping the students on side will not necessarily be easy. 

Crucial differences of opinion seem to be emerging between student leaders and members of the interim government over issues such as constitutional reform, the AL’s future and accountability for atrocities. Some student leaders, for example, have called for a ban on the AL and a complete rewrite of the constitution. 

Student leaders are also thought to harbour ambitions to set up their own political party, though that will likely take time. One said the political culture is so “polluted” that if the students got into the game now, “we’ll be exactly like the other parties”, implying that reforms must be undertaken first. “You cannot play cricket on a football field. You have to change the field first – after that we might play”, he explained, hinting that they may form a party, but only after reform comes to fruition – perhaps following the next election. 

In the meantime, students have formed a National Citizens Committee, a platform that seeks to lobby for reforms, for which they hope to build grassroots support. Without the formal structures of a party, though, the student movement could fracture, with some elements breaking with the interim government. 

As a Bangladeshi analyst noted, “The students are not organised under any ideology except that they want reform. I find it hard to see how they’ll remain a cohesive group”.

The Bangladeshi army – one of the few institutions Hasina was unable to completely control – is another major player. Its decision not to enforce Hasina’s 4 August curfew order is what sealed her fate, and army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman played an important role in coordinating discussions about forming the interim government. Neither Waker nor the army as an institution seems to have political ambitions, making them unlikely to undermine the interim government. 

“Both the elite and the low-level [military personnel] are all behind the military chief as long as the military is not going to lead”, said a military insider. In a rare interview, Waker said he is firmly behind Yunus, adding that he expects elections in twelve to eighteen months. “I will stand beside him. Come what may. So that he can accomplish his mission”, he promised.

That said, keeping the army’s support could limit the interim government’s ability or willingness to tackle past human rights violations or corruption by the military or senior security officials, as public opinion demands. Waker also appears to have his own ideas about political reforms that affect the military, suggesting that the president controls the armed forces rather than the prime minister. His views will need to be taken into account. “The army chief is hugely powerful”, confided a government source. “He doesn’t show his power, but he’s the one propping up this government in some respects”.

Sheikh Hasina’s toppling has also increased the influence of Islamists, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami and the hardline pressure group Hefazat-e-Islam. Sheikh Hasina, who presented herself as a secular leader, tried to shunt Jamaat aside by deregistering the party, persecuting its members and executing several of its leaders through a flawed war crimes tribunal. Her stance against Jamaat and more radical Islamic forces, including violent extremists, was an important reason why many secular Bangladeshis supported the AL. 

Ironically, though, her crackdown seems to have strengthened Islamist forces, which now find themselves well placed to help fill the political vacuum left by her abrupt departure. Once despised by many Bangladeshis due to its support for Pakistan in the liberation war, Jamaat now elicits sympathy as one of the Hasina administration’s many victims. In recent years, the party has also focused on providing essential services, such as health and education, in places the state neglected, allowing it to garner grassroots support.

Islamist forces played a prominent role in the anti-Hasina movement. When the demonstrations escalated in late July, Jamaat members – together with Hefazat-e-Islam and other Islamist activists – joined the student protests. 

This alignment has somewhat rehabilitated Jamaat’s image. The party has appealed to the Supreme Court to regain its registration, and it will clearly be a force for Dr Yunus to reckon with. He has already had to make compromises to accommodate Islamists, including appointing Jamaat-linked lawyers to the ICT and dissolving a committee tasked with reviewing school textbooks. 

The Islamists’ growing influence makes many secular-minded Bangladeshis nervous. “What will happen to me – a woman who doesn’t wear niqab, who works at night?”, asked a woman politician. “Honestly, they make me a bit scared for the future”.

One lesson of the Sheikh Hasina years is that trying to cut Islamist groups out of the country’s political fabric is likely to be counterproductive. “Bangladesh is never going to be a secular society”, an observer noted. “It’s important to engage Islamic forces rather than push them toward the fringe and make the fringe stronger”. 

An interim government member agreed: “We have to create a system in which everyone can express their opinion and hold protests legally, peacefully – provided they accept a democratic Bangladesh”. 

Their highly motivated supporters are a powerful force on the streets, but Jamaat and other Islamist parties – who are in talks about an alliance – pose a limited electoral threat, having never won more than 10 per cent of the ballot. They could, however, prove an essential prop to larger parties when it comes to mustering a majority in parliament.

More concerning is the risk of violent extremism, which should be distinguished from the Islamist political movement. Bangladesh has not suffered a major jihadist attack since militants killed dozens at an upscale bakery in Dhaka in 2016, but the weakness of the security apparatus in the aftermath of Hasina’s departure has likely increased the threat. 

Some banned groups are already taking advantage of the more open political environment to mobilise. On 26 August, Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani, the leader of a prominent extremist group, Ansar al Islam, was released from prison after being granted bail on terrorism charges; he had already served a five-year sentence for involvement in the murder of a blogger.

The interim government derives its mandate from a mass uprising. If it is unable to maintain popular support, it will likely have to call an early election that would almost certainly bring the BNP to office with few restraints on its power. In that case, Bangladesh might slip back into the politics of patronage, muscle and coercive use of state institutions, endangering the country’s future stability and squandering a rare chance at transformation. But an even worse scenario is possible. If disorder reaches crisis point, the army could step in, albeit reluctantly, likely heralding a prolonged period of military rule. All actors, domestic and international, should take steps to avoid these outcomes. 

To sustain public support for its long-term reform plans, the interim government will need to deliver a steady stream of results. It has already managed to chalk up successes in terms of ensuring accountability and securing financial aid. It has also announced Bangladesh’s accession to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and created a five-member national commission of inquiry to determine the whereabouts of individuals forcibly disappeared. 

In the international arena, the September meeting between Yunus and Joe Biden on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, in which the U.S. president pledged “continued support” for the interim government’s “reform agenda”, has provided an important political boost. Dhaka has also taken a more assertive position toward India, including submitting formal complaints to New Delhi over the killing of Bangladeshis by Indian forces along the border, which public opinion welcomes.

Yet even with new revelations of the Hasina administration’s corruption and mismanagement, which are emerging daily, the current enthusiasm will only sustain the government so far. The Yunus administration should identify more ways to keep up momentum over the coming year, while deeper reform plans take shape and the path to new elections is laid out. 

There are many steps the government could take to generate tangible improvements in people’s lives. Tackling petty corruption in delivery of public services – a common complaint in Bangladesh – would be one of them: given the scale of the challenge, targeting a particular aspect of corruption, such as fees for workers heading overseas, would make progress more feasible. Containing high prices would bolster household budgets; lifting wages in the garment sector, even a little, would benefit millions. Getting police back on the streets would help alleviate Dhaka’s notorious traffic jams, which have worsened in the officers’ absence. Restoring a steady electricity supply to homes and businesses would be a boon to the economy and Bangladeshis’ quality of life. Clearing the backlog of court cases by dropping the countless politically motivated charges filed under Hasina would not just be hugely popular, but more importantly would free up judges to focus on the real work of dispensing justice.

To improve day-to-day governance, meanwhile, the interim government should expand its cabinet. At present, some advisers are working on several portfolios and appear to be overstretched. In other cases, cabinet members who lack administrative experience would benefit from additional help, in the form of experienced aides and support staff. The interim government should also review the membership of the reform commissions and consider further appointments to make them more representative. 

Maintaining public support will help keep would-be spoilers in check. If the interim government’s agenda has strong backing, the political cost of attempting to undermine it will be high, providing good insurance against agitation for an early election. The interim government and the reform commissions it has established should also engage in genuine dialogue with key political players – not just allies such as the students and the army, but also the BNP and Islamist parties, particularly Jamaat given its political weight. Reaching consensus on key questions such as constitutional reform or the voting system will be difficult, and all sides will need to make compromises. 

At the same time, the interim government should quickly announce a clear schedule for the election. While many are calling for it to remain in office for a minimum of two or three years, eighteen months is a more realistic timeframe given the political pressures it faces. It should also seek to remain within the spirit of the constitution, to the extent possible, to minimise the risk that its actions are later deemed unconstitutional by the courts. 

The interim government should carefully consider how it goes about prosecuting those responsible for human rights violations – both recent cases related to the protest movement and older cases on Hasina’s watch. It should find a way to balance demands for speedy justice with the need to ensure fair trials and avoid claims of politicisation. A national mechanism with international involvement is likely best for that purpose. Given its chequered history, if the International Crimes Tribunal is to hear cases, the 1973 law underpinning it should be overhauled to ensure it meets international standards. 

It should also have at least one international judge. A parallel truth and reconciliation process, possibly with international support, could help avoid clogging the courts with less serious cases while giving the country a chance to move forward. In the meantime, the interim government should direct the police not to arrest those named in public complaints without sufficient evidence. The UN, meanwhile, should keep assisting investigations of human rights violations and help strengthen human rights protections.

More broadly, the government should try to restrain the purges that are occurring in all Bangladesh’s institutions, where anyone perceived as having links to the former government is being targeted for removal. While the impulse for revenge may be understandable, it is causing major upheaval within institutions and undermining the interim government’s day-to-day operations, in many cases without justification. The appointment of replacements has also been haphazard in some cases, causing resentment within institutions.

Similarly, the government should resist public pressure to ban the AL. While its leaders and senior officials are clearly implicated in heinous crimes, the party has been central to Bangladeshi politics for more than five decades and should have the opportunity to rebuild itself under new leadership. Not only is outlawing political parties contrary to the spirit of the movement that overthrew Hasina, but it also carries political risks. 

The AL has a hard core of supporters who might be pushed underground if the party were proscribed. “About 20 per cent of Bangladeshis, even if they witnessed genocide with their own eyes, would still support Sheikh Hasina”, observed a source close to the interim government. Keeping the door open to the AL would also empower those within its ranks who want to move on from the Hasina family, while weakening those who hope to destabilise the interim government to bring Hasina or a close associate back to office. 

Finally, the interim government is focused on establishing a system for holding credible polls after three national elections marred by irregularities. The task is far larger than overhauling the election commission. Yunus himself underlined that the work of five of the six commissions announced on 11 September are “essential for a free and fair election”. 

The public administration, police and judiciary all play an important role in organising and managing elections in Bangladesh; the senior bureaucrats known as deputy commissioners, for example, usually act as returning officers who oversee all polling activity in a particular constituency. It was in large part through her control of these institutions, combined with her 2011 abolition of the constitutional clause providing for a caretaker government, that Hasina was able to stage-manage three successive votes. Ensuring credible polls in the future will therefore require the interim government to succeed in pursuing its broader political reform agenda. 

That said, a new election commission comprising respected, non-partisan figures will be essential for building confidence in the electoral process. On 5 September, all five commission members resigned, saying they could not meet the constitutional requirement to hold an election within 90 days of parliament being dissolved. The outgoing members proposed several reforms, including proportional representation and the reintroduction of a neutral caretaker government. The interim government is expected to name their replacements in the coming months, while the commission on electoral reform is likely to propose changes to the body’s powers and responsibilities. The interim government has also said it will review the voter list. 

A key issue is whether to retain first-past-the-post voting, which critics say has contributed to Bangladesh’s toxic politics by creating what is in effect a two-party system. Shifting to proportional representation, they argue, would create space for more political parties. “We need a system that reflects the will of the people”, said a student leader.

Not surprisingly, with the AL in the doldrums, the country’s other main party, the BNP, is strongly opposed to the idea, as proportional representation could deny it a parliamentary majority. But analysts said they believed the BNP could be forced to accept the change. “Yes, the BNP will be the big loser, but it would be suicidal for them to go against it”, one said. “It’s a new ballgame and the best thing they can do is reinvent themselves”. How a proportional representation system could be designed in time for the next election is unclear, however, as it would seemingly require amending the constitution.

Outside powers have an important role to play in assisting the interim government’s reform efforts. The rhetorical backing proffered so far is promising, as are the billions of dollars of new loans, which should be expanded.

As seen during his September visit to New York, Dr Yunus’ international standing is one of the interim government’s key assets. He should use his profile to rally additional support for the administration and its reform plans. The interim government will also need to take care in managing relations with the incoming U.S. administration, given President-elect Donald Trump’s close ties to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and stated disapproval of “chaos” in Bangladesh.

International financial institutions, in particular, should materially aid the Yunus administration, to which economic instability is a major threat. These institutions can provide the technical and financial support the interim government needs to clean up the mess left by Hasina and her cronies, particularly in the banking sector. They should come through with the billions of dollars of additional support they have promised, which will be important for shoring up foreign reserves. 

Western countries’ standing in Bangladesh has been badly harmed by their longstanding support for Hasina and the widespread perception that, during her reign, they put their own interests above those of the Bangladeshi people. The European Union in particular and some of its member states are perceived as overly focused on doing business. They now have the opportunity to start repairing the damage. One area in which their technical support might be welcomed is security and judicial reform. Another important contribution would be helping strengthen the election commission and the electoral environment. They should also consider aid to ensure that national accountability mechanisms meet international standards. Safeguarding tariff-free access to European markets for Bangladeshi garment exports will help maintain economic stability.

The UN, embassies and financial institutions should coordinate to avoid overlap and ensure that support is coming from those best placed to give it.

Both the interim government and its external partners should be careful, however, not to waste their energies on certain sorts of technical assistance. Already, a scramble for influence is taking place among embassies in Dhaka, many of which are offering to provide advisers to the cabinet and bureaucracy.

The interim government needs to assess these offers carefully to ensure they serve Bangladesh’s interests, rather than those of the donors. The UN, embassies and financial institutions should coordinate to avoid overlap and ensure that support is coming from those best placed to give it. 

The UN should also work with the interim government and international donors to overhaul the Rohingya refugee response. Dhaka should lift restrictions on humanitarian agencies so they can make the response more sustainable, which in turn should help attract more donor support at a time when funding is dwindling. Interim authorities should also address insecurity in the refugee camps. 

Economic justice is also crucial. Over the past fifteen years, hundreds of billions of dollars have likely been funnelled illegally out of Bangladesh. Much of the lucre appears to have ended up in the United Kingdom, the US., the EU, Singapore and the Middle East. It is unclear if financial authorities and service providers – banks, lawyers, real estate agents and so on – in these countries conducted proper due diligence on the source of these funds. Such due diligence would have been particularly important, given that the clients were often politically exposed individuals and that, on paper, Bangladesh has strict rules about moving money out of the country. 

Since 2016, for example, Hasina’s land minister, Saifuzzaman Chowdhury, has allegedly built up a $500 million global real estate empire, including 360 properties in the UK alone. While he did not list them on his asset declaration when running for re-election in January, Chowdhury insists that he bought the properties with income from legitimate businesses outside Bangladesh that he has owned for years. 

The head of the country’s largest private bank, who is accused of having “siphoned off” more than $10 billion to companies he was affiliated with (as well as associates), reportedly has a $570 million property portfolio in Singapore. Through a U.S. law firm, the businessperson, Mohammed Saiful Alam, has insisted there is “no truth” to the allegations, decrying a “coordinated campaign” against him and “other leading businesses”.

Authorities in these countries now have a responsibility to work with the relevant Bangladeshi agencies to freeze the proceeds of corruption and other criminal activity on the part of Hasina and her cronies. They should then help recover the money so it can be returned to the rightful owners in Bangladesh, whether that is the government or the private sector. This step would also contribute to stabilising the financial sector by building up banks’ asset base.

As Bangladesh’s largest neighbour and the regional heavyweight, and in light of its history in supporting the war of independence, India holds a unique position among the country’s foreign partners. But New Delhi, which has historically backed the AL, needs to accept the new Bangladeshi reality. Its unwavering support for an unpopular autocrat over the last fifteen years has done immense damage to its reputation among Bangladeshis. 

It now needs to tread carefully to avoid actions that suggest it could be undermining the interim government. Additionally, it should take the initiative to help Bangladesh prosper, such as by proposing new talks on water sharing deals, improved border management and a review of bilateral economic agreements. It should also reach out to opposition forces, including the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, with which it has hardly any relations. 

Sheikh Hasina’s flight from Bangladesh on 5 August has created a once-in-a-generation opportunity for political renewal that can move the country beyond the bitter divisions and violence that has characterised much of the past five decades. The interim government has a strong public backing for reform and the support of key players, including student leaders and the army. Major parties have also said they are willing to delay elections in favour of reforms. The interim government has identified its priorities, outlined a process and laid out an initial timeline.

The risks that this reform process unravels are formidable, however. The interim government will need to build political consensus while maintaining economic stability and delivering steady results to ensure that the Bangladeshi public remains firmly behind it. The alternatives would be unappealing for both Bangladesh and its partners.

Holding elections without reforms to put checks and balances on a future government could let another autocratic regime emerge, while a military takeover would be an even bigger setback. International actors should work with the interim government to support its ambitious goals and help move Bangladeshi politics into a new era.