Myanmar’s ‘other war’
There is a debate among geopolitical experts as to whether Myanmar’s forceful pushing of hundreds of thousands of its citizens into Bangladesh can be defined as any sort of war instigation. But what is not discussed at all is the free flow of narcotics from that country into Bangladesh. Around 800 thousand Rohingyas have arrived and Bangladesh has restricted them to a few square miles for the time being. But for months on end, every day a few hundred thousand ‘Red Dogs’, ‘R-Seven’, ‘Champa’, etc, have been entering the country and is spreading around 55 thousand square miles. Experts say there is hardly a single village in Bangladesh where yaba from Myanmar hasn’t reached.
According to Bangladesh’s Department of Narcotics Control, in 2017 a total of 40 million yaba tablets alone where seized. This is around 50 times more than was seized in 2010 and 11 million more than the previous year. One yaba pill costs between 300 to 2000 taka in the capital. It is generally estimated that the seized drugs constitutes about one twentieth of the actual amount of drugs smuggled into the country. Based on that, then, at least 800 million yaba tablets come into Bangladesh a year, that is, five tablets per head. The market price of this is at least Tk 240 billion. Ironically, formal trade between the two countries does not even exceed Tk 6 billion.
According to journalist Mainul Hasan of Cox’s Bazar, this is nothing short of a disaster for Bangladesh, but no one openly admits this. He says, there is no significant new economic activity in Cox’s Bazar other than yaba. There are even yaba addicts within the administration that is supposed to clamp down on the drug. He says that though Cox’s Bazar is an entry point, the big consignments to directly to Dhaka and other cities of the country. He went as far as to compare the imminent state of this trade with the Latin American country Colombia.
Nongor (meaning ‘anchor’) is a rehab centre in Cox’s Bazar. Rashed Didarul, a young official of the organisation, estimates that there are around 100 thousand yaba addicts in the district alone. Established in 2001, Nongor has so far treated 7500 addicts. Didarul says that there has been an ‘unbelievable’ increase in the supply and consumption of yaba. And there has also been an alarming increase in women yaba dealers and consumers. Rashed Didarul says with regret, “This is a war being waged against the country, and everyone is happily a part of it. The entire Cox’s Bazar is busy sharing the ill-gotten gains from the yaba trade.”
There is hardly any scope to dismiss Mainul Hasan and Rashed Didarul’s concerns as exaggeration. The 10 May issue of China’s ‘Global Times’ termed Cox’s Bazar as a ‘meth town’ in one of its reports. It is clear that there is international concern over the volume of yaba entering Bangladesh.
Those who know a bit about Myanmar’s history, will be aware that the country has long being known for its opium production and sales. Myanmar comes second only to Afghanistan when it comes to opium production. But with the demand for opium falling by 25 per cent in recent times and the increase in demand for methamphetamine, the country’s narcotic industry has been flourishing exponentially.
Myanmar’s Shan province is one of the largest narcotic production hubs in the world at present. But now methamphetamine manufacture has spread further from Shan to Kachin and many other areas. Through various routes it has now hit Bangladesh like a tsunami. Unfortunately, in the absence of any political or administrative commitment in Bangladesh against the influx of drugs, methamphetamine flows across the border unabated and no pressure has been put on Myanmar to being a halt to the drug smuggling.
At a bilateral meeting between the Bangladesh and Myanmar governments in August 2017, Bangladesh demanded that steps be taken to halt the production and smuggling for yaba. Bangladesh’s Directorate of Narcotics Control even handed over a list of containing the names and locations of 50 yaba factories in Myanmar.
It is not easy for Myanmar to stop the production because partial war-like conditions exist in the areas where yaba is manufactured. There is invariably one local armed group or the other active concerning the manufacture and marketing of yaba. The yaba factories or laboratories are mostly in the jungles and some are even mobile. If Myanmar really wanted, it could obstruct the yaba route. But the government’s commitment in that regard is not strong. It is not Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD that controls the country’s home and border ministry, but the armed forces. It does not seem as if they have any working relations with the Bangladesh government.
The commitment of the administration even this side of the river Naf is questionable. In most cases, the actual cornerstones of the smuggling pyramid are not caught. Occasionally some yaba is found in a ‘discarded state’. Bangladesh’s role in tackling the border narcotics trade comes under further question when compared to the India-Myanmar border. The India-Myanmar border is nearly 1643 km. And Bangladesh guards only 272 km or border with Myanmar. Yet the illicit narcotic trade between India and Myanmar is very limited. Even though the growth of yaba production along its western border has flourished basically due to the Indian raw material pseudoephedrine, the two countries actively make efforts to keep the situation under control. On 26 February this year, the two countries held the third inter-state cooperation conference in this regard.
Bangladesh is not vocal on an international level regarding Myanmar’s drug empire, but several countries of the world are, particularly a dozen or so countries of the Asia-Pacific region. These include China, Thailand, Cambodia, Japan and others. They keep Myanmar under pressure. They use the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to exert this pressure. There is the 1961 international convention and the 1972 protocol concerning narcotics as well as two other international agreements. Various countries use these legal documents to pressurise Myanmar through UNODC.
Initially this pressure started over opium production. Like yaba and heroin, the hub of opium manufacture is still the Golden Triangle of the northeastern Shan province. There is very little military control in this area near the border of Thailand and Laos along the rivers Mekong and Ruak. The area is under control of the Shan State Army - South (SSA-S) and United Wa Army. SSAS and the Wa Army are the two armed groups in Myanmar with which the government still does not have a ceasefire. Some yaba have the initials W-Y and this basically is the sign of the Wa Army. The Wa Army has about 20 thousand soldiers. This is an indication of their strength and the strength of the drug economy. Of course, it is the carriers who make the most money from yaba. There is almost a 50 time difference in the price of yaba at its production and its marketing.
In the past, the Golden Triangle was controlled by Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army. When Khun Sa was killed on 26 October 2007, the Mong Tai Army almost entirely merged with the SSA-S. According to UNODC, there are at least 50 labs in the Golden Triangle and these produce about one billion yaba tablets a year. Most of this is smuggled over the Thai and Laos borders. The raw materials for yaba in Shan and Kachin basically come from China.
While the Myanmar army has no control over the production and smuggling of yaba directed towards China-Thailand-Laos, they can halt the consignments to Bangladesh because this route is basically from the centre in Myanmar to Cox’s Bazar.
Bangladesh needs to step up its contact with UNODC and have intense and extensive involvement in their activities. But first of all, they need to clean up their own home.
* Altaf Parvez is a researcher on Southeast Asian history. This piece has been rewritten in English by Ayesha Kabir.