Asif Bin Ali
Asif Bin Ali

Exclusive Interview: Asif Bin Ali

Foreign policy must be clearer amid geopolitical tensions

Q

Prothom Alo: Two years have passed since the July mass uprising. Looking back, how do you view the uprising?

Asif Bin Ali: The uprising showed us very clearly how devastating the consequences can be when the social contract reached in the 1990s among political parties or alliances and citizens over the process of transferring power is broken. Whoever breaks the social contract between the people and democracy, the people will eventually take to the streets and throw that political power out of office. That is how I would like to view July. Compared with other mass movements or uprisings of previous decades, the 2024 mass uprising involved a much greater degree of brutality and violence. The Awami League government and the state used extreme violence to suppress the movement. There were also retaliatory incidents in some cases. Now we need to see whether, after July, when the situation became normal and a new elected government came to power, they are addressing this violence through the law or ignoring it. In Bangladeshi society, political violence has traditionally gone without proper justice. As a result, victims have no real avenue for psychological closure.
The state must acknowledge the losses suffered by victims regardless of their identity and provide them with a means of healing. The only way to do that is through justice. The government must ensure it. Otherwise, lasting peace and stability will not come to society.The uprising showed us very clearly how devastating the consequences can be when the social contract reached in the 1990s among political parties or alliances and citizens over the process of transferring power is broken. Whoever breaks the social contract between the people and democracy, the people will eventually take to the streets and throw that political power out of office. That is how I would like to view July.

Compared with other mass movements or uprisings of previous decades, the 2024 mass uprising involved a much greater degree of brutality and violence. The Awami League government and the state used extreme violence to suppress the movement. There were also retaliatory incidents in some cases.

Now we need to see whether, after July, when the situation became normal and a new elected government came to power, they are addressing this violence through the law or ignoring it. In Bangladeshi society, political violence has traditionally gone without proper justice. As a result, victims have no real avenue for psychological closure.

The state must acknowledge the losses suffered by victims regardless of their identity and provide them with a means of healing. The only way to do that is through justice. The government must ensure it. Otherwise, lasting peace and stability will not come to society.

Q

We have seen much discussion about the successes and failures of the interim government. How do you assess its performance?

Asif Bin Ali: The government’s main responsibilities were to restore stability and law and order and to hand over power to elected representatives through a proper and acceptable election.

Its major success was holding an acceptable election. Although the interim government, the military and the BNP were all extremely firm about holding the election, all three contributed to this achievement and that contribution should be acknowledged.

Its major failure was that, despite receiving enormous public support after the mass uprising, it did not use that support properly to make the state neutral. Instead, it moved the state towards what could be described as a process of “Jamaatisation.” Although there were some right-wing elements as well as secular elements within the government, Jamaat’s influence was greater. The government spoke about reforms and accountability but did not apply those principles to itself.

Now the BNP government has come to power and is reversing that Jamaatisation while moving towards what could be called “BNP-isation.” We have not seen the rule of institutional norms here. The discussion about merit and competence has turned into a discussion about loyalty to power.
The qualitative change that was expected after the July uprising suffered a major setback.

Q

What are your thoughts on state reform?

Asif Bin Ali: The discussion about reform had actually been going on for some time. The uprising brought it to the centre of attention. It created expectations among people that the state would become more humane, institutions would function properly, democracy would become smoother and accountability would be established. But I believe the primary responsibility for state reform does not belong to an unelected representative or an interim government. They came into power under a special set of circumstances, and their sole objective should have been to hand over power to elected representatives through a free and fair election as quickly as possible.

The interim government prepared several reform plans and proposals through various commissions. I have no doubt about their good intentions, but their process was flawed. Members from civil society presented themselves as the sole custodians of reform and portrayed politicians as opposed to reform. This reduced the discussions to a largely artificial exercise.

Politicians adopted a strategic position that blocking the reforms would delay the election, while the non-political advisers believed their strategy was succeeding. Ultimately, the politicians won that contest.

After coming to power, they set aside many reform proposals, including the fundamental foundations of an independent judiciary, an independent judicial secretariat and a human rights commission. As a result, it may seem that we have returned to where we started.

Q

What is your assessment of the BNP government’s first few months in office?

Asif Bin Ali: A certain degree of abnormality and instability still prevails in the corridors of power in Dhaka. In this situation, the BNP government appears to have adopted a “go slow” policy. It will take some more time to determine how much of this policy is strategic and how much is due to a shortage of competent people. If this is a strategy aimed at ensuring state stability, it is commendable. But if the policy is being followed because of conflicts among various syndicates and because competent people are not being placed in the right positions, it will lead to failure.

Regarding the instability, first, there is a crisis of balance of power. Since July, two major forces have emerged: the BNP, which represents centrist politics, and Jamaat and the NCP, which represent right-wing and centre-right politics. But the space on the centre-left that the Awami League had occupied for so long is now completely vacant. No new political force has yet emerged capable of filling this major vacuum.

Second, although major oligarchic groups suffered a significant setback after July, they still possess substantial economic capital and have not yet been brought fully under the rule of law.

Third, there appears to be internal tension or friction within the state forces that has not yet completely subsided. In addition, some far-right elements have emerged in society that possess the capacity for violence, and some mainstream intellectuals, journalists and teachers are also supporting them.

If an elected government cannot manage these competing tensions and conflicts through a gradual, non-violent democratic process, the situation could become more heated at any time.

Q

There has been considerable discussion about the BNP government’s foreign policy. Naturally, relations with the United States, China and India are particularly important. Do you see any clear direction in the government’s foreign policy?

Asif Bin Ali: The current government says its foreign policy is based on “Bangladesh First”—putting the country’s interests above everything else. Every government in every country says this. But the BNP government needs to clarify what this principle actually means, particularly in terms of economic negotiations and bilateral relations. It remains unclear whether Bangladesh will follow a rule-based foreign policy or pursue something else.

In Bangladesh, domestic politics is deeply intertwined with foreign policy. Strong opposition to India is currently popular in the political arena, while a policy of strengthening ties with the United States is also clearly visible. At the same time, efforts to expand relations towards Southeast Asia do not appear to have succeeded. ASEAN has made it clear that Bangladesh cannot become a member. Bangladesh’s current foreign policy is highly unclear and unpredictable. A mature foreign policy must be predictable so that other states can understand our position.

Foreign policy should not be left to cheap populism. It needs to be placed within a rule-based framework that protects the country’s long-term interests and establishes Bangladesh as a responsible state in the international arena.

Q

What kind of response are you seeing from India and the United States to the prime minister’s visit to China?

Asif Bin Ali: A certain degree of discomfort and speculation has emerged in both India and the United States. That is natural, because every country will assess the situation from the perspective of its own interests. But in Bangladesh’s interest, we need to maintain balanced and mutually beneficial commercial relations with China, India, the United States and Russia.

As part of US global foreign policy, one of its major strategic interests in this region is to contain China in the Bay of Bengal. Our neighbouring country Myanmar is experiencing a civil war, while China and India are engaged in a global and regional power struggle. Amid this three-way equation, Bangladesh occupies an important geographical position because of its access to the Bay of Bengal. If Bangladesh becomes excessively close to China under these circumstances, the United States could use all its influence to take countermeasures. Amid these geopolitical tensions, Bangladesh’s main security safeguard is to maintain a predictable and principled foreign policy with clarity.

Q

What do you see as the future of the economic corridor proposed by China?

Asif Bin Ali: Given Bangladesh’s current relationship with the United States, joining this corridor would be extremely difficult for Bangladesh. If we do so, the US and Indian sides would likely jointly oppose it, putting the government under considerable geopolitical pressure. Moreover, the proposed corridor is supposed to pass through Myanmar, which is currently experiencing an intense civil war, with China, India and the United States each having their own interests there. India’s interests are particularly deep in the area through which the corridor would enter Bangladesh. So the geopolitical complexities are considerable.

Some believe that if the corridor is implemented, China will help Bangladesh resolve the Rohingya crisis. I disagree with this view. The Rohingya issue is extremely complicated. In the past, China has consistently supported the Myanmar government over the Rohingya crisis. So the issue cannot be resolved simply through a corridor. Under the current circumstances, even a diplomatic solution appears extremely distant, while any military action would be highly risky. The Rohingya issue is such a complex puzzle for us that no one knows for certain how it can be solved.

Q

Tensions have emerged again in Bangladesh-India relations over Sheikh Hasina’s statements from India. How do you view India’s position and its explanation?

Asif Bin Ali: Sheikh Hasina’s issue is now a political reality in Bangladesh-India relations, which I call the “Hasina block.” The political activities Sheikh Hasina is carrying out from India are taking place with India’s consent, and this is naturally creating a strong reaction in Bangladeshi politics. Even when Bangladesh and India try to normalise their relations, the issue of Hasina repeatedly becomes an obstacle. We will see more such incidents in the future. As a result, although the relationship between the two countries may face stagnation and prolonged instability, bilateral trade and economic ties will continue to function normally in the mutual interests of both countries.

On issues such as the renewal of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty and the border situation, Bangladesh also needs to strengthen its negotiating capacity in diplomacy. We need to understand that India is a water-hegemonic state and is also ahead in terms of capabilities. We cannot gain an advantage in negotiations simply by setting an agenda before a bilateral meeting. If we want to gain leverage at the negotiating table, we also need to focus on academic research and institutional capacity. As for instability along the border, much of the responsibility lies with the domestic politics of West Bengal and Assam in India. The politics of expelling Bangladeshis there is reflected in the situation along the border. On the border issue, both countries need to understand that the Bangladesh-India border is not like a conventional, war-oriented boundary. There are even situations where the courtyard or kitchen of one house falls across the border. Therefore, the two countries need to reach a common understanding based on specific policies.

Q

How do you view Sheikh Hasina’s statements from India and the Awami League’s current political position?

Asif Bin Ali: Bringing Sheikh Hasina back to Bangladesh and putting her on trial will be extremely difficult. India is unlikely to abandon its long-standing policy of providing shelter to political leaders from neighbouring allied countries. India itself knows that it is impossible for Sheikh Hasina to return to power in Bangladesh. However, it may be interested in the Awami League’s future leadership. But given the political understanding that has emerged in Bangladesh after July, there is no longer any easy scope for Sheikh Hasina or her associates to be accepted into politics.

For the past two years, the Awami League has focused its political messaging solely on retaliatory violence and has completely denied responsibility for the violence committed by the party. It has adopted this strategy to portray itself as a victim. But the party has remained completely silent about its decade-long authoritarian rule, serious human rights violations and its violation of the social contract between the people and democracy by undermining the elections of 2014, 2018 and 2024. It is deeply unfortunate that the party continues to rely on conspiracy theories instead of engaging in self-criticism.

One of the great tragedies of Bangladeshi politics is that, over the past 55 years, no political party has accepted responsibility for its mistakes. Instead, there has been a persistent culture of denial.

Even after authoritarian ruler Ershad lost power in the face of a massive popular uprising, he never apologised. Jamaat has never directly acknowledged or engaged in self-criticism over its involvement in the 1971 genocide. And the Awami League, too, is unlikely to acknowledge its mistakes in state repression. That is because our politics lacks a culture of admitting mistakes. Politicians think: if they can return to power without admitting their mistakes, why should they do so? In the meantime, ordinary citizens and victims are forced to live with long-term trauma.

Q

Thank you.

Asif Bin Ali: Thank you as well.