Bangladesh’s National Defence Policy-2018 marked a significant advancement in state security thinking. It was the first comprehensive security policy document of independent Bangladesh since 1974. It was formulated following prolonged institutional impetus, discussions, and recommendations.
As early as 2009, the Bangladesh Army had formally presented the necessity of such a policy to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. The concept of a ‘people-friendly’ armed forces, alignment with Forces Goal 2030, and the proposal to form a National Security Committee were undoubtedly positive steps.
However, praise and complacency are not the same. The realities under consideration when this policy was framed seven years ago have shifted considerably. Today’s security environment is far more complex, fast-evolving, and information-driven. Yet, as Bangladesh approaches the announcement of the national budget for the 2026–27 financial year, crucial matters such as defence expenditure remain largely excluded from public discourse.
2. Over the past few years, harsh realities have emerged for smaller states. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; Israeli aggression in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere, or the recent US maneuvering over Cuba, alongside the ongoing Iran-US war— all clearly demonstrate that the politics of territorial conquest has not been relegated to history. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s swift military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh displaced over 100,000 Armenians. However, that was not merely a military campaign; it was simultaneously an information war. Baku was far ahead of Yerevan in controlling the international narrative. Similarly, China’s incremental advances in the South China Sea clarify that while each step may appear minor in isolation, the cumulative effect can be profound and virtually irreversible.
Bangladesh is by no means immune to strategic risks. The border with Myanmar has long been volatile. Since 2022, repeated incursions by Myanmar into Bangladesh’s airspace and territorial waters have continually come to light. Beyond this, another major reality is Bangladesh's geopolitical positioning, where it cannot afford to ignore the influence of much larger neighbours in terms of military expenditure.
The 2018 Defence Policy emphasised preventive diplomacy and conflict avoidance. Principally, this is correct. However, in today’s world, diplomacy alone is insufficient unless backed by a robust information strategy. This is because when a vacuum is left in the field of setting narratives, someone else fills it. In the era of information warfare, losing the narrative often means the erosion of one’s diplomatic leverage.
3. Today’s conflicts do not occur solely on land, at sea, or in the air. Concurrently, they play out in the information arena. Social media has virtually collapsed the boundary between the battlefield and the public sphere. A viral video can expose the location of a military unit within hours, trigger panic among the families of service personnel, spark debate in parliament, and shift international public opinion. Often, this transpires before any official statement can be released.
The Ukrainian experience is instructive here. The country did not sustain international support merely through military resistance; it also demonstrated skill in information warfare. They possessed a strategic communication plan, trained information professionals, and a clear understanding that controlling the narrative is an intrinsic component of national defence.
Bangladesh’s 2018 Defence Policy contains only a few brief paragraphs regarding media relations. It mentions maintaining cordial media-military relations and exchanging training between media personnel and military members. Yet, this does not constitute a comprehensive policy; rather, it is a statement of intent.
It reflects the language of an era when media relations were viewed primarily as public relations. Today, however, information is weaponised by both state and non-state actors. The personal social media accounts of service personnel can also pose intelligence risks. Furthermore, the reputation of a military institution is now one of its most vital strategic assets.
4. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) is the official public relations organ of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It is staffed by skilled and responsible officers. However, the issue is not one of individuals, but of structure. The Bangladesh Armed Forces Journal itself acknowledged in 2024 that the activities of the ISPR remain constrained due to a lack of adequate coordination with media and civilian institutions. Independent analysts have been echoing similar observations for nearly a decade.
The reality is that the ISPR was designed for a media ecosystem that no longer exists. Today requires the capability for real-time disinformation countermeasures, tested communication protocols during crises, and civilian media expertise to engage with the international press. Without these, countering modern information warfare is exceedingly difficult.
The 2009 Pilkhana tragedy brought this deficiency into sharp focus. In the immediate aftermath of the incident, institutional communication was reactive and inconsistent. Consequently, speculation dominated the public domain for an extended period. A similar trend was observed during the political transition of 2024. To many, the institutional statements did not appear consolidated or effective.
This issue is equally critical for UN Peacekeeping Missions. A major portion of Bangladesh’s global reputation is tied to its contributions to peacekeeping. Yet, when allegations are leveled against Bangladeshi contingents on the international stage, a proactive strategy to protect that hard-earned reputation is often found wanting.
5. The shortcomings in Bangladesh’s defence governance are not confined to communication alone. Bangladesh has consistently ranked in the ‘D’ or ‘E’ bands of Transparency International UK’s Government Defence Integrity (GDI) index. This signifies a high risk of corruption and severe deficits in transparency within defence operations, procurement processes, and financial management. This cannot be brushed aside as a mere commentary by an external agency. It directly impacts the trust of international partners, Bangladesh’s credibility in peacekeeping missions, and the internal legitimacy of defence spending.
As Bangladesh prepares to present its national budget, a structured process for public consultation on defence spending—both inside and outside parliament—should have been initiated. In a democratic state, the defence budget is also a matter for the public. This expenditure is funded by taxpayers’ money. The children of the citizenry serve in the armed forces. Therefore, the public has a right to know why defence expenditure is being incurred, how it is being utilised, and what outcomes it yields.
6. Taking all factors into account, four urgent reforms are required at this juncture:
First: The revised defence policy must recognise information warfare as an independent domain of national defence. Just like land, sea, and air operations, the information domain requires a distinct institutional framework and budget allocation.
Second: The ISPR must no longer function merely as a public relations office. It must be transformed into a Strategic Communication Command. Alongside military officers, it must incorporate civilian media experts, digital communication professionals, and personnel skilled in countering disinformation.
Third: Mandatory security protocols must be established for the social media usage of serving military personnel. Countries such as the UK, Singapore, and India have already adopted policies in this regard. Bangladesh cannot afford to delay this any further.
Fourth: The observations of the GDI should not be viewed as a reputational embarrassment, but rather as an opportunity for governance reform. A credible defence policy cannot be forged without transparency in defence procurement, parliamentary oversight of the budget, and an independent audit system.
Bangladesh’s 2018 Defence Policy was drafted for a time when conventional deterrence, bilateral diplomacy, and manageable regional tensions were the primary considerations. However, the reality in 2026 is entirely different. Today, hybrid warfare, algorithm-driven disinformation, drone strikes, proxy conflicts, and economic pressures have collectively transformed the very concept of security.
* Rezwan Ul Alam is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Media, Communication and Journalism at North South University.
* Views expressed are the author’s own.
* The opinion, originally published in the online and print editions of Prothom Alo, has been rewritten in English by Shameem Reza