When a distant strait shapes the dinner table: Bangladesh’s fertiliser risk

Rising tensions among the United States, Israel, and Iran in the Middle East have once again drawn attention to the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic maritime routes. This narrow passage is not only crucial for transporting global oil and energy supplies but also plays a significant role in the international fertiliser trade.

Nearly one-third of the fertilisers traded globally pass through this corridor. As a result, any military confrontation or disruption to shipping in this region could rapidly impact global agricultural production and food security.

According to UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Strait of Hormuz handles a significant share of global maritime trade, including roughly one-third of internationally traded fertilisers and about a quarter of global seaborne oil shipments.

Nearly 30 percent of the world''s traded urea moves through the Strait of Hormuz. Nitrogen-based fertilisers are a fundamental component of modern food production. Research refers that they support roughly half of global food output. Urea is essential for cultivating staple crops such as wheat, maize, and rice. As a result, any disruption in fertiliser supply can quickly reduce agricultural production and create instability in food markets.

Agricultural scientists estimate that synthetic nitrogen fertilisers support nearly 50 percent of global food production, meaning a sustained disruption could significantly affect crop yields worldwide.
In this sense, fertiliser is not merely an agricultural input; it is a foundational pillar of global food security, quietly sustaining billions of lives behind the scenes.

The Persian Gulf region is one of the world''s major fertiliser production hubs. Iran is the fourth largest exporter of urea globally, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also major suppliers in this market. However, nitrogen fertiliser production relies heavily on natural gas. Energy costs account for roughly 60 to 80 percent of total production expenses. When energy supply becomes uncertain, fertiliser production costs rise rapidly and global prices tend to follow.

This tight coupling between energy and fertiliser markets means that any geopolitical shock in the Middle East simultaneously triggers a dual crisis, first in fuel, then in food.

Five Gulf producers, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, accounted for roughly 34 percent of global urea trade and about 23 percent of ammonia exports in 2024, highlighting the region’s central role in the fertiliser supply chain.

Signs of volatility have already begun to appear in the fertiliser market amid the recent tensions. The price of Egyptian urea, a key benchmark in global markets, climbed to around $505 per tonne in early March as supply fears intensified but earlier in late February, prices were noticeably lower, reflecting rising uncertainty in the fertiliser trade. Such a sharp increase in a short period reflects the level of concern spreading through the market.

Markets, in this case, are not reacting to actual shortages alone but to the anticipation of disruption, a reminder that perception of risk can be as powerful as disruption itself.

Recent market reports indicate that fertiliser prices in some markets have already increased by more than 20 percent since tensions escalated, while analysts warn that prolonged disruptions could push nitrogen fertiliser prices even higher during the peak planting season.

If such price increases coincide with critical agricultural cycles, the impact becomes structurally embedded, translating temporary shocks into long-term food inflation.

Countries that rely heavily on fertiliser imports face the greatest risk. India, one of the world’s largest importers, depends significantly on Gulf countries, with total imports expected to reach around $18 billion this fiscal year. Other major producers, including Brazil and the United States, also rely on stable fertiliser supplies.

India alone consumes over 35 million tonnes of urea annually and remains the world’s largest importer of the fertiliser, making it highly sensitive to disruptions in Middle Eastern supply routes.

Given the interconnected nature of global food markets, disruptions in large economies such as India or Brazil inevitably spill over into smaller import-dependent countries like Bangladesh through price transmission and supply competition.

When fertiliser prices rise, farmers often reduce their usage to cut costs. This can lead to lower crop yields and higher food prices. Analysts warn that tightening fertiliser supply can increase the cost not only of grains but also of animal feed and everyday food products. In practical terms, this may translate into higher prices for items such as bread, pasta, meat, and dairy products.

This chain reaction reveals a critical truth: fertiliser inflation does not remain confined to farms, it moves steadily into household kitchens.
Experts warn that shortages in fertiliser supply during key planting seasons could reduce crop productivity by 2 to 5 percent globally, a decline that could have major implications for food availability in vulnerable regions.
Even a marginal decline in global yield can trigger disproportionate price volatility, particularly in import-dependent and densely populated countries.

The global food system is still struggling to recover from several major shocks. The war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-related disasters have already weakened food supply chains around the world. A new disruption in fertiliser supply could further worsen food security in many parts of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.

What emerges is not an isolated crisis but a layering of shocks, each one compounding the fragility of an already stressed global food system.
The International Fertiliser Association estimates that a prolonged disruption in Gulf exports could remove tens of millions of tonnes of fertiliser from global markets annually, creating severe pressure on agricultural supply chains.

Farmers across the Northern Hemisphere are currently preparing for the next planting season. If fertiliser shipments from the Gulf region are disrupted at this critical moment, the effects could spread rapidly across global agricultural markets. In the coming months, prices of staple foods such as pasta, potatoes, and other everyday products may rise even further.

Timing, therefore, becomes decisive; disruptions during planting seasons do not just delay production, they permanently reduce it.

For Bangladesh, the situation carries particular significance. The country has shut four of its five fertiliser factories due to gas shortages, while it also relies heavily on imports from Middle Eastern producers to meet its urea demand. In recent years Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have been among Bangladesh''s main suppliers. In many cases these supplies come through large state-owned or multinational companies such as SABIC in Saudi Arabia and Fertiglobe in the UAE. Bangladesh also imports urea from countries like China and Russia on occasion, but a substantial share of its supply still originates in the Persian Gulf.

This dual dependency, on imported energy for production and imported fertiliser for consumption, places Bangladesh in a uniquely vulnerable position within the global supply chain.

Bangladesh consumes roughly 2.5 to 3 million tonnes of urea annually, with a significant portion imported to meet domestic demand due to limited local production capacity. Bangladesh typically imports granular or prilled urea, and these shipments help meet an annual demand that exceeds one million metric tonnes.

The current geopolitical tensions are putting this supply system under considerable pressure. The Strait of Hormuz is a key route for roughly 20 to 30 percent of global fertiliser exports. If shipping through this passage is disrupted, exports from the Gulf could decline significantly. For countries that depend on imports, finding alternative sources may not be easy, especially during critical agricultural seasons. Industry analysts note that nearly half of global seaborne sulfur shipments, a key ingredient used in phosphate fertiliser production, also originate in the Gulf region and pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

Such concentration of supply within a single geographic corridor highlights a structural weakness in the global agricultural system, one that becomes visible only during crises.

Bangladesh does not import much urea directly from Iran because of long-standing United States sanctions. Nevertheless, disruptions affecting shipments from Saudi Arabia or Qatar could still affect Bangladesh''s fertiliser supply. In such a situation the country may have to rely on more expensive alternative sources, placing additional pressure on the agricultural sector.

For Bangladesh, the implications of such disruptions extend beyond trade logistics. The country’s food security system depends heavily on stable fertiliser supplies, particularly for rice cultivation, which accounts for the majority of fertiliser consumption nationwide. In a country where agriculture supports the livelihoods of millions and helps ensure food security for more than 170 million people, maintaining access to affordable fertilisers is not simply an economic concern but a strategic priority. In effect, fertiliser security is food security, and food security is national stability.

This situation highlights an important lesson for policymakers: global geopolitical shocks can quickly translate into domestic agricultural risks. Bangladesh therefore needs a more resilient fertiliser supply strategy that reduces vulnerability to disruptions in a single region or trade route.
One important step would be to diversify fertiliser import sources. While the Middle East will likely remain a major supplier, Bangladesh could gradually expand procurement partnerships with producers in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Such diversification would reduce dependence on any single geopolitical corridor and help stabilize supply during periods of regional instability.

Strategic diversification, however, must go beyond geography and include contract structures, storage systems, and long-term supply agreements.

Another priority lies in strengthening domestic production capacity. Revitalizing idle fertiliser plants, modernizing aging infrastructure, and investing in more energy-efficient production technologies could help Bangladesh reduce its reliance on imports over the long term. At the same time, improving natural gas management and exploring alternative energy options for fertiliser manufacturing could make domestic production more sustainable.

In the long run, energy reform and fertiliser security must be pursued together as part of an integrated policy approach.

Bangladesh could also invest more actively in agricultural efficiency. Promoting balanced fertiliser use, precision farming techniques, and improved soil health management would allow farmers to maintain productivity while reducing excessive fertiliser dependence. Even modest improvements in nutrient management could significantly reduce fertiliser use without compromising crop yields.

Strategic reserves may also play an important role. Establishing a stronger national fertiliser reserve system could allow the government to stabilise supply during global disruptions and prevent sudden price shocks that directly affect farmers.

Such reserves function not only as economic buffers but also as instruments of policy stability during periods of global uncertainty.
Yet even in times of crisis there can be a different kind of possibility.

Moments like this remind us how deeply interconnected and fragile the global economic and food systems have become. They also encourage societies to rethink their lifestyles, consumption habits, and relationship with nature.

For decades, consumerism and excessive consumption have shaped an economic structure where people assume that everything will always remain readily available. Reality tells a different story. Nature has its own limits and rhythms, and sustainable living requires that we learn to move in harmony with those rhythms.

Crises of this nature expose not only vulnerabilities in supply chains but also deeper questions about sustainability and resilience in human development.

If societies gradually begin to accept this reality, dependence on artificially inflated production could decline. People may rediscover seasonal foods, local resources, and alternative agricultural practices. This shift would not only reduce the pressure of consumption but also help people understand the true value of what they use. It could also open the door to a slower and more conscious way of living.

There is another dimension to this change. When people move away from unnecessary consumption and begin to prioritize self-reliance and local capacity, a quiet pressure emerges on the global economic system itself. After all, that system draws much of its strength from the endless cycle of consumption. In that sense, resilience is not only about supply, it is also about rethinking demand.

If societies respond to crises only with fear and dependency on external powers, these possibilities will remain unrealised. What is needed instead is preparation for the future. That means strengthening local production, improving agricultural efficiency, and using resources in more thoughtful and sustainable ways.

Perhaps then we will begin to see more clearly that the system which has long kept people running in a race of endless competition, always chasing the promise of more, may itself face its greatest challenge when people finally understand that the true value of life cannot always be measured in money.

* Rubaiyat Zannat Ripa completed her postgraduate studies at the University of Dhaka

* Nafew Sajed Joy is a writer and researcher.
Email: nafew.sajed@gmail.com

* The views expressed here are the authors' own