Opinion

Politics: Understanding with Jamaat and NCP’s identity crisis

A significant segment of the July mass uprising, those who later formed a political party under the name National Citizen Party (NCP), has now chosen to contest the election through an understanding with Jamaat-e-Islami. It is not that all young people have accepted this decision. Many argue that the NCP has lost the moral purity of its politics through this step.

Protests have emerged from within the NCP itself. In a letter of protest, dissenting members angrily invoked Jamaat’s anti-independence role, stating, “The political history of Jamaat-e-Islami, particularly its anti-independence role during the Liberation War of 1971, its collaboration in genocide, and its involvement in various crimes committed at the time, fundamentally contradict the democratic ethos of Bangladesh and the values of our party.”

Physician Tasnim Jara, a prominent face of the July movement and senior joint member secretary of the NCP, has announced that she is severing ties with the party. NCP joint convenor Tajnuva Jabeen resigned from the party and, referring to the understanding with Jamaat, said, “I cannot digest this even to the point of death.” Former information adviser Mahfuj Alam, who was considered close to the NCP, has also spoken out against the arrangement.

Many have been disappointed by the NCP’s decision to form an alliance with Jamaat. But was anyone really surprised? Since its formation, on most of the issues on which NCP leaders spoke loudly and assertively, Jamaat echoed the same positions. Likewise, when Jamaat articulated its views, the NCP often struck a similar tone. On various issues in the July Charter, the demands of the two parties were largely aligned, although Jamaat benefited more. This is because the July Declaration rewrote history in a way that effectively sanitised Jamaat’s role in 1971.

Many have been disappointed by the NCP’s decision to form an alliance with Jamaat. But was anyone really surprised? Since its formation, on most of the issues on which NCP leaders spoke loudly and assertively, Jamaat echoed the same positions. Likewise, when Jamaat articulated its views, the NCP often struck a similar tone.

Both the parties were aligned from the outset on declaring the Awami League illegal through executive orders, and both repeatedly spoke out against what they termed “Indian hegemony”. When an eight-party right-wing alliance was formed under Jamaat’s leadership in November 2025, the NCP was expected to join, but ultimately did not. At that time, a section within the NCP was attempting to forge an alliance with the BNP, but that effort also failed. Viewed realistically, the NCP–Jamaat understanding is not entirely unexpected. What will now attract the most attention is how far these young leaders can maintain a balance while engaging with a coalition rooted in religion-based politics.

Has the NCP’s identity crisis been resolved?

After the success of the July mass uprising, a large portion of students and young people withdrew from politics. Among those who remained active, many became controversial in various ways. They repeatedly imposed blockades at Shahbagh intersection over different issues, pressured media owners to dismiss journalists, made unrestrained statements about the army, and exerted pressure by placing their representatives within the government. These actions embroiled the NCP in controversy and generated an identity crisis for the party.

At one point, it appeared that they were downgrading the Liberation War of 1971 in comparison to 1947 and the July uprising. This tendency further deepened their identity crisis, and it was reflected in the rhetoric of their leaders. At times, NCP leaders spoke in a tone of pressure and intimidation; at other times, through the language of religious politics; and at yet other moments, they appeared in civil society forums speaking like civil society actors. This inconsistency created confusion among the public about the nature of their politics.

By forming an electoral understanding with Jamaat-e-Islami, the NCP has now acquired a pro-Jamaat identity of its own. NCP leaders, however, insist that this is not an ideological unity but merely an electoral arrangement.

The reality is that there are now two major political alliances in the country. On the right-wing side are Jamaat, Khelafat and the NCP, among others. On the other side, under the leadership of the BNP, are a number of centrist forces, better described as personalities rather than fully fledged political parties.

If a national election takes place, national politics will no longer be centred on the streets but primarily within parliament. In such a situation, if the NCP can win even a handful of seats by aligning with the Jamaat-led alliance, it will be able to retain a presence in national politics.

Tarique Rahman’s return to the country has made the BNP’s influence and support base more visible, which is likely to have a significant impact on the election.

Jamaat had, for a long time, carefully cultivated a “clean” image, but cracks have begun to appear in it. The civility of young supporters, which Jamaat had leveraged to secure sweeping victories in student union elections such as DUCSU (Dhaka University Central Students’ Union), JUCSU (Jahangirnagar University Central Students’ Union) and RUCSU (Rajshahi University Central Students’ Union), has now been exposed. Within just two months, several “slips of the tongue” by Islami Chhatra Shibir leaders and incidents of teachers being harassed have created public anxiety. Outside universities, there have also been incidents of tendons being severed. These developments are widely believed to have a negative impact on Jamaat’s electoral prospects.

Jamaat may be able to spin a new narrative for itself by including the NCP, the party of the July movement’s youth leaders, into its alliance.

The NCP has increasingly become confined to Dhaka-centric activities led by a handful of top leaders. Its organisational identity rests largely on the public recognition of a few student leaders from the July movement. However, they have failed to expand their organisational base. As a result, discussions about the election have largely remained limited to the two major parties.

In this context, doubts have emerged within the NCP’s top leadership about whether even its well-known figures could secure a guaranteed victory in any constituency by contesting under the party banner alone. Many believe that contesting the election in alliance with Jamaat would yield better results.

If a national election takes place, national politics will no longer be centred on the streets but primarily within parliament. In such a situation, if the NCP can win even a handful of seats by aligning with the Jamaat-led alliance, it will be able to retain a presence in national politics.

In this election, however, the NCP’s new identity may actually help the BNP consolidate centrist voters. Moreover, if the BNP comes to power, it will face a single opposition bloc rather than two, an advantage for any governing party.

The NCP’s greatest fear is whether it can sustain its very existence. As soon as the process of forming an electoral understanding with Jamaat began, intense reactions erupted within the party. Some leaders have left while many who remain are deeply uncomfortable.

The NCP will now have to shoulder part of the burden of many negative perceptions surrounding Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladeshi politics. Many political analysts believe this to be a risky decision for the NCP.

Some argue that this will increase the BNP’s concerns, since the inclusion of a new party in any alliance inevitably expands its vote base. Others disagree, suggesting that the NCP’s inclusion will not significantly alter Jamaat’s vote share. Had the NCP contested the election alone, it might not have won seats but could have emerged as a centrist competitor in the future. In this election, however, the NCP’s new identity may actually help the BNP consolidate centrist voters. Moreover, if the BNP comes to power, it will face a single opposition bloc rather than two, an advantage for any governing party.

Amid the cycles of alliance-making and alliance-breaking, there remains a significant cause for optimism. Political parties’ engagement with elections and constitutional politics is increasing. It is to be hoped that, after the election, parliament will once again become the central arena of politics.

* Saleh Uddin Ahmed is a teacher, writer and political analyst. He can be reached at salehpublic711@gmail.com

* Views expressed are the author’s own