Bangladesh's prime minister Sheikh Hasina on 8 July went to China on a four-day visit. Later, though, she cut the trip short by a day and returned on 10 July. The foreign ministry and the prime minister's press secretary came up with two different explanations for the visit being cut short. Rather than delving into that debate, let's look into what Bangladesh achieved, and didn't achieve, in this important visit.
Bangladesh and China signed 21 MoUs in Beijing. Several declarations were also made. When it comes to numbers, this is quite impressive, but in actuality none of these was very significant. At the end of the trip, a 27-paragraph joint statement was issued.
Most of the joint statement comprised expressions of mutual support, commitment to maintain communications at a high level, expression of satisfaction at the completion of various projects, further deepening of cooperation in the area of trade and commerce, assurances of China's cooperation in building Smart Bangladesh, increasing cooperation in agriculture and water management, cooperation in blue economy, cooperation in upholding Asian cultural heritage and so on. Most of these hardly have any significance in the context of current events.
The foreign minister has said that the visit has been successful. That means these were all the expectations from the prime minister's trip and these expectations have been met. Generally speaking, though, that does not seem so. There were many more expectations from this trip which were not fulfilled -- that is the general belief. It is the norm to declare success at the end of any official visit and I believe the foreign minister made this statement in keeping with the norms. He is well aware that there were no significant achievements on this trip.
In evaluating this trip of the prime minister, one must also take into consideration her trip to India which took place close on the heels of the one to China. We naturally do not know what transpired during the exclusive talks between the two leaders during the prime minister's India trip, but it can be deduced that the Indian prime minister apprised Bangladesh's prime minister of India's concerns about its regional competitor China. This was inferred to an extent in the foreign minister's words. He said India had no objections to the visit to China. This no-objection implies that India had been assured that Bangladesh will not do anything with China what goes against Indian interests.
China has committed to speaking with the Arakan Army if necessary regarding Rohingya repatriation. If that actually is so, and if China truly wants to resolve the problem, then this must be seen as a big achievement
This very simple assumption of mine did not prove to be accurate. From quite some time before the visit there had been talk to the effect that Bangladesh would be receiving the equivalent of 5 billion US dollars in Chinese yuan. Some rather over optimistic ones predicted a 20-billion-dollar package. But at the end of the day, assurance was given for a mere one billion yuan, equivalent to more or less 138 million US dollars only
There were basically two issues. One, Teesta river water management project and two, Chinese financial assistance for Bangladesh to overcome its economic crisis and foreign currency crunch, that is, grants or loan. The need for the Teesta project arose as friend India blocks the river flow, completely ignoring Bangladesh's need during the dry season.
China was quite eager about this project from the very beginning and the Chinese ambassador had expressed hope that work on this would commence immediately after the election. But when the Indian foreign secretary came on a visit and unexpectedly proposed Indian funding of the project, it was clear that the matter was placed on hold. After returning from India and on the eve of the China trip, the foreign minister more or less made it clear that India would be involved in the project, not China. It is only natural that China would not appreciate this decision. Surely everyone remembers the Sonadia port issue.
It can't quite be said that there has been no success on the second issue. I had assumed that China knows and understands that it is not possible on the part of Bangladesh's present government to take any decision that invokes the displeasure of India. Even so, they would be interested in providing financial assistance, particularly project funding, in their own interests. After all, they will get their loan back along with interest. Also, their contractors will get the project work at high rates with no competition. Even if they provide budget assistance, that money will be used to purchase commodities from China.
This very simple assumption of mine did not prove to be accurate. From quite some time before the visit there had been talk to the effect that Bangladesh would be receiving the equivalent of 5 billion US dollars in Chinese yuan. Some rather over optimistic ones predicted a 20-billion-dollar package. But at the end of the day, assurance was given for a mere one billion yuan, equivalent to more or less 138 million US dollars only.
Given the size of Bangladesh's economy, the prevailing crisis and the urgent need for foreign currency, this amount was downright paltry.
Why did this happen after all that fanfare, rhetoric of taking relations to a new height, a game-changer visit and so on? A very polite explanation can perhaps be constructed. But the bottom line is, no matter what high-flying talk there may be about bilateral relations, it all boils down to give and take.
To the apparent eye it seems that our prime minister didn't take along anything to offer to China on her trip tangible enough for China to reciprocate by meeting Bangladesh's needs. Quite to the contrary, China noted that only recently Bangladesh provided India with a railway corridor, getting nothing visible in return. And in future if India and China get involved in any heated confrontation, this corridor may prove to be an alternative to India's Chicken's Neck or Siliguri corridor.
It may be said that Bangladesh has always been firm in its One China policy and has always maintained the Taiwan and Tibet are a part of China. Undoubtedly this is important to China, but not enough. China will want to see Bangladesh maintaining some sort of balance in its relations with India and China. The events of the last two weeks do not indicate any such thing.
All said and done, possibly something positive has emerged from this trip. While there was no clear mention of it in the joint statement, the foreign minister told the press briefing that China has committed to speaking with the Arakan Army if necessary regarding Rohingya repatriation. If that actually is so, and if China truly wants to resolve the problem, then this must be seen as a big achievement. Arakan Army will be majorly in control of the Rakhine state in post-civil war Myanmar and Rohingya repatriation will not be possible without their cooperation.
*Md Touhid Hossain is a former foreign secretary
*This column appeared in the print an online edition of Prothom Alo and has been rewritten for the English edition by Ayesha Kabir