Opinion

Efforts to empower a titular president in this manner are unprecedented

On the final day of the two-month continuous discussions of the Consensus Commission (31 July 2025), political parties expressed their views on several important issues. One of the most significant among these was the increase of the president’s powers.

The Consensus Commission believes that the position of the president should not remain ‘ceremonial’ but must become ‘powerful.’ In this case, the appointment of key government officials should be made directly by the president.

The Commission proposes that the president should have direct authority to appoint 12 key positions, including the chiefs of the armed forces, the head of the NSI, the chief of the DGFI and the governor of Bangladesh Bank.

During discussions on this matter, various parties took different positions. Attempting to empower the titular presidency in this way within a parliamentary framework is unprecedented.

Such efforts to empower the president could create disorder in the executive branch, that is, the governance system led by the prime minister and the cabinet, instead of maintaining balance. Ultimately, in a parliamentary system, a balanced relationship among the legislative, executive and judiciary branches is necessary. Artificially empowering the president in this manner may upset that balance rather than support it.

The issue of empowering the president was discussed in the Consensus Commission primarily with the intention of bringing the prime minister’s power under a system of “checks and balances.” It is true that during previous governments, the executive power was concentrated solely in the hands of the prime minister.

Those appointed to these important state positions must be qualified, possess specialised knowledge, be politically aware and have extensive experience in the relevant fields.

Through the Twelfth Amendment, the presidency was made ceremonial. All executive decision-making authority became centralised in the hands of the prime minister. The president’s powers gradually diminished to almost zero, and all state affairs were conducted based on the advice of the prime minister. Because this overly centralised governing power was held exclusively, the prime minister’s decisions were final in the nomination and management of all important executive positions. Over the past decades, alongside other qualifications, party loyalty became one of the key criteria in the appointment process for various top executive posts.

The merit of nominations, which should have been evaluated for appointments to important positions, was often overlooked. As a result, these nominations and selections were frequently questioned. More importantly, in decision-making at key government institutions, various interests often took precedence over the national interest.

To overcome this situation, the interim government has made several recommendations through various reform commissions aimed at preventing the concentration of power and restoring balance. These include limiting the prime minister’s term, electing parliamentary committee chairs from among opposition party members, ensuring a transparent process for appointing the chief justice, and strengthening local government systems.

If these proposed recommendations are implemented, the prime minister’s accountability will increase, and undue influence over the country’s three pillars - the legislature, executive, and judiciary - will decrease.

Increasing the powers of the president by granting direct nomination or appointment authority over various institutions related to the executive branch conflicts with this process. Such empowerment of the president would weaken the balance among the three branches. In a parliamentary system, the presidency is a ceremonial position. Attempting to empower this position by weakening the executive branch will create problems and complications in government administration.

It is true that those appointed to these important state positions must be qualified, possess specialised knowledge, be politically aware and have extensive experience in the relevant fields. For appointments to these specialised posts, it is necessary to have clear merit-based criteria and apply them properly.

The prime minister or the cabinet will consider applications from qualified candidates, prepare a shortlist, seek proposals through a recommendation committee, and finalise appointments accordingly. Provision can be made for the nominated individual to explain their qualifications before parliament.

In the appointment of the government’s top positions, an important addition could be the inclusion of a parliamentary framework. Through the formation of a parliamentary committee of no more than 10 members, the parliament’s opinion could be sought on important government appointments. This committee could be composed of the deputy leader of the ruling party, the chief whip and two whips of the ruling party, the leader of the opposition, two opposition MPs, one member from the reserved women’s seats, the chairman of the relevant parliamentary standing committee, and one member nominated by the Speaker. The individual nominated for a top government position would explain their qualifications to this committee.

This process would ensure accountability and transparency in appointments. In India, the executive branch holds sole authority over important top executive appointments, with the prime minister consulting the president as needed. In Pakistan, the president has authority over appointments to certain posts but makes decisions after consultation with an appropriate commission.

Ultimately, for the dynamic functioning of the executive branch, the prime minister must have competent top executives in various positions who are appointed through his/her nomination. If this authority is exercised by others, the prime minister’s executive power is weakened. Instead of increasing the ceremonial powers of the president, qualified appointments must be ensured using the parliamentary framework. This will provide procedural transparency and eliminate undesirable imbalances of power.

* Dr. Khandakar Golam Moazzem is Research Director, CPD