No more politics of vengeance, let a culture of tolerance begin

The expectations that took shape in the minds of the common people in Bangladesh regarding the post-5 August 2024 government that emerged from the student–mass uprising were, in a word, sky-high. After more than a decade and a half of accumulated deprivation, inequality and injustice, many people perhaps believed that a change of government would bring overnight redress for all of it.

In many cases, these expectations were not aligned with reality, but after being released from a suffocating situation of 17 years, such boundless hopes were not unnatural either. The daily scenes of angry gatherings or protests over various demands at Shahbagh or in front of the Secretariat are a reflection of these enormous expectations.

For an interim government, managing, let alone resolving, the long-accumulated grievances of so many people in a single day or even within a year is truly an arduous task. It would have been difficult for any elected government as well. But the question of the government’s success or failure is not tied solely to whether it could manage these demands; it grew more acute because of the absence of even a minimum level of stability.

Had the government been able to ensure at least a basic level of good governance in some areas against the backdrop of people’s limitless expectations, this loss of public trust might not have taken root. Two issues in particular must be mentioned: improving the law-and-order situation and reining in the prices of essential commodities.

In my view, one of the principal reasons for the government’s failure on these two issues was the absence of an effective relationship between the government and political parties. Political parties are key stakeholders in running the state, yet the government has been gravely unsuccessful in engaging them as partners. The inability to build any relationship of trust with political parties is perhaps this government’s greatest failure.

In this regard, I have some observations about the composition of the advisory council. Because a large portion of the council consists of NGO representatives, they have often run their portfolios with a mindset shaped by managing NGOs. People from the NGO world, for various reasons, tend not to place much trust in politicians. This lack of trust on the government’s part is also reflected in the statements of political leaders, from whom one has heard, with a sense of grievance, that the chief adviser calls them in, offers tea graciously, and then sends them off with pleasant words.

\\The implication is that while the government maintains courtesy with politicians, it fails to build any effective or substantive working relationship with them. Precisely because of the absence of a meaningful relationship with political parties, it has become difficult for the government to bring a sense of relief to public life.

The government has also displayed extreme incompetence in managing the bureaucratic disorder that followed 5 August. After the mass uprising, a state of chaos emerged within the bureaucracy, such as mass promotions and a scramble to place party loyalists in key positions. The government failed to rein all this in. Instead, it appeared that the advisory council relied excessively on this very disordered bureaucracy to carry out its work.

There may be little scope to question the qualifications of the advisory council members in terms of credentials or professional experience; the problem lay elsewhere. In a post-uprising situation, governing the state required out-of-the-box, innovative and unconventional thinking, which was largely absent. They attempted to run the government along well-worn, old bureaucratic paths. At a time when the country’s economy was shattered, the bureaucracy dysfunctional and political institutions on the brink of collapse, the kind of radical or fundamental reforms that were needed were nowhere to be seen.

The most alarming issue is that planned violence and acts of sabotage occurring in different parts of the country have not been prevented. I am not referring here to the vandalism or attacks that took place immediately after the mass uprising, because an outburst of pent-up public anger at that moment was to be expected. But in the months that followed—especially in recent times—the brutal murder of Sharif Osman Hadi and the situation that emerged in its aftermath have pointedly exposed several disturbing realities.

In this context, a comment by New Age editor Nurul Kabir is particularly relevant. He stated bluntly that the attacks on institutions such as Prothom Alo, The Daily Star, or Chhayanaut may have been allowed to happen by the government, or by a section of it. That is a deeply troubling thought.
If we keep Nurul Kabir’s observation in mind while considering how the killers of martyred Hadi managed to cross the border and flee to India, a serious question arises: could such orchestrated mob violence and acts of brutality have occurred without the assistance of some section of the government or one of its agencies? Is there a faction within the government itself that seeks to destabilise the situation through such subversive activities? If so, then this subversive conduct, more than mere incompetence, would constitute the gravest crisis facing this government.
Given this situation, a major question now is whether the government is capable of holding a credible election.

Professor Yunus or some advisers may well be sincere about elections, but there is a strong buzz that a section of the advisory council wants to prolong its hold on power without going to the polls. If factions within the government become obstacles on the path to elections, that would amount to a betrayal of the spirit of the mass uprising.
If it becomes evident that any government agency or adviser is visibly engaging in actions that delay the holding of elections, it would plunge the entire state into crisis.

A new polarisation is emerging in the political landscape. With the return of BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman and Jamaat-e-Islami’s initiative to form a new alliance, electioneering on the political field appears, at least on the surface, to be intensifying. At this juncture, it is difficult to say what impact Khaleda Zia’s death will have on the BNP’s electoral prospects. However, there remains doubt over whether all the parties active on the ground truly want elections.

As some voices raise the slogan “justice first, then elections” in the wake of Sharif Osman Hadi’s tragic death, it reinforces this doubt. A fair trial must certainly take place, and the process must begin immediately. But it must also be remembered that we seek not vengeance or revenge, but justice. The time required for that must be given. The trial process that begins today may well be completed under a new government.
Alongside these doubts, there is also a perception in society that even neighboring India may not want a genuinely acceptable election in Bangladesh. The ousted authoritarian forces may also wish for continued uncertainty in the country. The government must move forward while confronting this multifaceted challenge.

Yet there is hope in the people of Bangladesh, who, regardless of party affiliation, are eager for an election. They believe that only an elected government can manage the current chaotic situation. If the people see that the government is sincere in organising elections, they will stand with it. As the election approaches and political parties enter the process, some of this uncertainty weighing on the government may ease.
In the current context, one of the biggest tasks for a post-election government will be to stabilize the economy. The previous government destroyed state institutions and ruined financial discipline.

Money laundering and embezzlement under the guise of development have driven the economic situation to a critical level. The current government’s economic advisers have attempted to bring some order to the banking sector, which is commendable. Restoring economic discipline amidst this overall chaos will be a major challenge for the new government.

But an even greater challenge is restoring tolerance in society and the state. The misrule of the past 17 years and the vacuum created after its collapse have given rise to extreme intolerance in Bangladesh. The primary responsibility of the new government will be to restore tolerance and stability. Not vengeance in the pattern of the past, but rather the establishment of a culture of justice. In so-called murder cases, accused individuals should not be left hanging; instead, their actual responsibility must be determined, and justice must be delivered.

Above all, the new rulers or political forces must remember that Bangladesh will no longer function as it did before. People are now far more aware and fearless in expressing their opinions. This is a red signal for the leaders of tomorrow. If they fail to ensure good governance, the people will not forgive them.

* Sayeed Ferdous is a writer and researcher