Politics of Hasina’s extradition and Bangladesh–India relations

Bangladesh's former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who is living in India as a fugitive after being convicted in Bangladesh, has repeatedly stated in recent weeks that she wants to "return" to Bangladesh. She made the remarks in interviews with Reuters on 10 July and AFP on 29 July. However, she is undoubtedly aware that any return would have to proceed under the Bangladesh-India Extradition Treaty and India's Extradition Act of 1962, mechanisms that Bangladesh has repeatedly invoked in seeking her extradition.

There is little reason to believe that Hasina or her advisers are unaware of the legal framework. Consequently, politics—not law—appears to be the principal motivation behind her statements.

Nor is it likely that Hasina would make such declarations without at least the knowledge of, and perhaps some indication from, sections of the Indian authorities. The politics behind her remarks has two dimensions: one related to Hasina and the now-banned Awami League, and another concerning Bangladesh-India relations.

Hasina's immediate objective appears to be energising the Awami League activists inside Bangladesh. Her supporters have already been carrying out limited political activities, and she seems eager to encourage them to become more active. The apparent calculation is that sustained activism could increase pressure on the Bangladeshi government.

For nearly two years, Hasina has used social media to provoke tensions and encourage violence. These efforts have failed to restore her political legitimacy, and her latest declaration is, in effect, an acknowledgment of that failure. By presenting supporters with a clear objective—her return—she also seeks to give them a rallying point. 

Another purpose of her announcement is to discourage any attempt to reorganise the Awami League without her leadership, particularly from within Bangladesh. As long as legal proceedings continue, she can claim that she wishes to return but is prevented from doing so because of legal complications, placing the blame on the Bangladesh government.

The timing of her announcement is also significant. She chose July so that she could remain a central topic of discussion during the second anniversary of the mass uprising that ousted her from power. It is reasonable to assume that she hoped political parties in Bangladesh would disagree over how to respond.

Despite differences among political parties over elections and post-election issues, they remain united on the questions of Hasina's trial and extradition. Only those who helped legitimise her authoritarian rule have voiced dissent. It is also plausible that she chose this timing to create uncertainty around Victory Day celebrations in December and reinforce the Awami League's long-standing claim to exclusive ownership of the legacy of the Liberation War.

These considerations are not necessarily decisive for India, but they are useful to Indian policymakers. There has been no visible shift in India's broader approach toward Bangladesh or in its longstanding policy of keeping Bangladesh within India's sphere of influence. Following Bangladesh's February 2026 election, the BNP-led government has taken concrete steps to improve relations with India, and India has signaled a positive response.

However, the substance of India's actions remains open to question. Continued allegations of "push-ins" across the border, ongoing border killings, land allocation in West Bengal for new border fencing, statements by BJP leaders and their allies in neighbouring Indian states, the announcement of plans to implement the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in West Bengal, and slow progress in addressing Bangladesh's trade deficit all send less encouraging signals.

Another important issue is the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which expires in December this year. For years, the Teesta water-sharing agreement has been the principal unresolved issue in water relations between the two countries. But unless a new Ganges agreement acceptable to Bangladesh is reached before the current treaty expires, it could become a new source of difficult negotiations.

Meanwhile, discussions are underway on implementing the Teesta project with Chinese assistance. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to China has also raised the prospect of closer Bangladesh-China ties, including a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and consideration of a China-Bangladesh economic corridor through Myanmar. At the same time, India's concerns over Bangladesh's improving relations with Pakistan are understandable. Bangladesh also has new opportunities to expand its trade relationship with the United States. Together, these developments provide the BNP government with greater room to pursue a foreign policy that is less dependent on India.

After India's unwavering support for Hasina's government during its 14 years in power, and its decision to shelter her after the 2024 uprising while allowing anti-Bangladesh propaganda to operate from Indian territory, considerable public resentment toward India has emerged in Bangladesh. The BNP government cannot easily ignore this sentiment.

In an interview with BBC Bangla in October 2025, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman remarked, "If India gives shelter to an autocrat and becomes unpopular among the people of Bangladesh, there is nothing we can do. The people have decided to keep their distance from them. So, I must stay with my people."

India's continued sheltering of Hasina, its protection of fugitive Awami League leaders, and its failure to take meaningful action after reports emerged in August 2025 that the Awami League had opened an office in Kolkata all suggest that New Delhi's Awami League-centered policy remains unchanged. Some in India appear to hope for the Awami League's return to Bangladeshi politics. Whether India will actively facilitate such a return remains an open question.

Observers of Indian foreign and regional policy have warned that such an approach would be counterproductive. It is understandable that India wants to keep Hasina politically relevant in Bangladesh. From India, she has continued political activities and allegedly encouraged violence inside Bangladesh.

However, a report presented by the Indian government in the Lok Sabha on 30 July stated that India's policy of not allowing its territory to be used for political activities directed against another country also applies to Hasina. This should be regarded as a positive step. India should make it clear that this policy will be consistently enforced. Whether that happens should become evident in the near future.

Recent discussions in Dhaka between India's ambassador, Dinesh Trivedi, and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman also produced agreement that bilateral relations need a "reset." (Prothom Alo, 29 July, 2026)

It is also worth recalling how Indian policymakers viewed the situation after Hasina took refuge in India in August 2024. Former senior Indian diplomat TCA Raghavan told the BBC that providing Hasina refuge during a moment of danger was consistent with India's principles, and that exposing her to greater danger was "not an option." He also argued, "If we do not stand by Sheikh Hasina now, no friendly leader anywhere in the world will be able to trust India." (BBC Bangla, 24 August, 2024)

There has been little sign of any change in this thinking. Regardless of what the law may require, political considerations make India unlikely to support Hasina's extradition. The question is whether its role will remain limited to offering her refuge.

India may also use Hasina as a source of diplomatic leverage in its dealings with Bangladesh. One method has been allowing her to make statements capable of creating instability inside Bangladesh, thereby placing pressure on the government. Her recent remarks suggest such a strategy may continue. There is little reason to think Hasina would object, since her main goal is to remain politically relevant.

During her years in India between 1975 and 1980, Hasina also prioritised her own political future. But Bangladesh-India relations were very different then. India had not yet developed today's regional ambitions, and its leaders were more preoccupied with domestic political challenges. Hasina was therefore not viewed as a strategic asset in Indian policymaking.

India's political and economic interests in Bangladesh were also much more limited. It is natural that India would seek to preserve the asymmetrical relationship it established between 2009 and 2024. Given India's role in sustaining Hasina's government during that period, it would not be surprising if it now expected her to continue serving its interests. As long as she remains abroad, Hasina is likely to reappear periodically as a source of tension, irritation, and political division in Bangladesh. Indian policymakers, however, should recognise that such a role ultimately harms diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One hopes that Bangladesh's government, policymakers, and political parties will carefully consider these realities when formulating their positions, public statements, and strategies. At the same time, they should continue to apply united pressure on India for Hasina's extradition to ensure justice and fulfill the commitments made to those killed and injured during the July 2024 movement.

* Ali Riaz is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University and former vice-chair of Bangladesh's National Consensus Commission under the interim government.

* The views expressed are the author's own.