Interview: Ali Riaz
‘National security risks may arise if the election is not held'
Following discussions with political parties, the July National Charter is being drafted based on 84 reform proposals put forward by six reform commissions. The charter has stalled due to differences among the parties over how to implement the constitution-related reform proposals. Professor Ali Riaz, vice-chairman of the National Consensus Commission, is leading the discussions on behalf of the commission. In an interview with Prothom Alo's senior correspondent Riadul Karim , he talks about the July Charter and its possible modes of implementation.
You all had wanted to present the July National Charter in July. That did not happen. The charter remains stalled over the question of implementation methods. The commission’s term has already been extended twice. Will you be able to complete the process by 15 October?
I hope we can. The charter itself is no longer under discussion. The issue now is the process of implementation. So far, in fact, we’ve only sat together for three days. Broadly speaking, even within that short span, a kind of consensus is emerging on how many options there should be. Based on what the input from the political parties, we are considering consolidating all that and presenting perhaps two or three options.
I am very optimistic that we will be able to reach a position on the implementation process at the beginning of October. Once that is resolved, the matter of finalising the charter will be complete.
You gave the political parties a recommendation from the experts on the last day of discussions. It stated that a constitutional order could be issued first, and subsequently a referendum could be held on that order. Suppose a constitutional decree is issued—that would mean the constitution has been amended. Our parliament becomes bicameral, and we have voted. Now, if for any reason the constitutional decree is not passed in the referendum on the day of the parliamentary election, what would be the constitutional basis for the national election?
No, those are two separate matters. The parliamentary election and the referendum -- one is not giving the other legitimacy.
Once the order or decree is issued, it means it has come into effect, that is, the parliament will become bicameral. The election in February will be for the lower house of the bicameral parliament. Now, if for any reason this proposal is not passed in the referendum, what would be the legitimacy of this election?
You are assuming that it will not be passed in the referendum. From 1790 to 2016, there have been more than 800 referendums worldwide, and only in 6 per cent of cases did the referendum fail.
The second point is this, suppose in the referendum it turns out that the bicameral parliament is not adopted. The parliament you are electing, however, is the lower house or the national parliament. Now, what will happen on the day of the national parliament election? The upper house elections will not take place on that day; they will happen later.
We are holding the election with a bicameral parliament in mind. For example, right now we cannot hold an election for a bicameral parliament. Once the constitutional decree comes into effect, it will become bicameral. If it is not passed in the referendum, does the parliamentary election remain legitimate?
Of course it does. According to expert, it must be “validated.” If the referendum is invalidated, the other parts are unaffected, there is no impact. This is because the order they are referring to does not mention the lower house. So the lower house already exists.
If the addition is not validated, then the addition will not happen. The concern lies elsewhere. Suppose all these efforts and agreements on various issues are then rejected by the people. That is why I say we must be prepared to accept it if it is truly rejected by the public. We are saying that the people’s decision is final. In Chile, for example, a referendum has failed twice.
Some of the decisions made by the Consensus Commission—for example, that the same person cannot simultaneously hold the positions of Prime Minister and party chief, or appointments to the four constitutional posts—have differences of opinion from the BNP. How will the implementation of those points, where there are notes of dissent, be carried out?
My sense is that there remains scope for further discussion among the political parties. This is not initiated by the commission, but is left to the parties themselves.
Another point you need to consider is the expectation of the people. Political parties reflect the aspirations of the public. After the 1990 mass uprising, a large number of people in Bangladesh believed that the country should have a presidential system. Evidence of this is that they voted for the BNP, and it was in the BNP manifesto. But it was seen that, putting this aside, when people said they wanted a parliamentary system—civil society wanted it, the opposition wanted it, and other citizens wanted it—the BNP then adopted the parliamentary system.
If a constitutional decree is issued, how will the issue of dissenting opinions be addressed?
Suppose we say that the charter is moving forward. Then it is implied that there are notes of dissent, that there are differing opinions. On the other hand, if we interpret it differently—if the people feel that it needs to be implemented despite these notes of dissent, then certainly the political parties that issued the notes of dissent will reconsider.A
Is there any provision in the law or constitution to indicate that anyone has a dissenting opinion?
No, you cannot go into that level of detail in any law. The experts talking about the constitutional order are referring to issuing an order as a package covering specific matters, explaining why these orders are being issued, because if you don’t issue the order, people cannot be asked: “Do you want this or not?”
Look at the 1991 referendum, we can forget about earlier referendums. What was the question? It asked whether we would adopt a parliamentary system. Now, what does adopting a parliamentary system mean? The Prime Minister becomes the chief executive, right? There are many other details, but relatedly, going to a parliamentary system means the 300 members in parliament won’t sit and debate every aspect. It has major legal and constitutional implications. Did you explain to every individual that if we go parliamentary, this will happen, that will happen?
So, will the points of dissent be included in the referendum?
Our expert panel says that the referendum will be held on the orders themselves. The referendum is for implementing these orders.
But you issued the order first, and then the referendum. Why not hold the referendum first?
The referendum is not held first because, when we spoke with the expert panel, the question arose: on what basis would you hold the referendum? First, you would have to create a law for the referendum. Our most recent referendum law was enacted in 1991, and that law only provides for referendums on specific provisions of the constitution.
The question is how you place this within a legal framework. That is why our experts ultimately said that it must be validated in a referendum. Otherwise, it cannot happen. In other words, you are going to the people; the structural power of the people is being exercised.
In a sense, the interim government is certainly an expression of the people’s will—otherwise, this government would not exist. But they are not making the decision alone; they are again going back to the people. From this perspective, it is said: you also have to run the country. So you need a parliament or a representative assembly of some kind. You need something, right? You need a legislature because this interim government cannot be permanent. They must go through a transition. So, whether you call it a parliament or an assembly, some legislative body must be created to run the country day-to-day. At the same time, it will determine, based on the people’s input, what amendments to make, what additions to include, and how to shape the future of the state.
You were the head of the Constitution Reform Commission. Your goal was to bring a balance of power and prevent constitutional autocracy in the future. Many of the proposals you made regarding balance have ultimately been changed. To what extent has your goal been achieved?
It would not be accurate to say that all of our goals have been achieved. The Constitution Reform Commission made proposals after careful consideration. One important issue was the National Constitutional Council. Not everything we envisioned was accomplished, but it’s not that nothing was achieved either.
I would ask you to consider this from two perspectives. First, you and I are discussing this now. The fact that this can be done through a legal constitutional process—the people and the political parties now understand this—is itself an achievement. I do not evaluate it merely by what laws were made or what changes were made in the constitution. I see it as a gain in political culture, in terms of people’s participation.
Second, quite a lot has been achieved. Take, for example, the issue of the Prime Minister’s term. Let me give an example: traditionally, when a Prime Minister in our country comes to a third term, serious problems begin to occur. You will notice this happens with every Prime Minister. When that happens, a kind of restraint is created.
We have been able to separate the Election Commission from the executive branch. There are several parliamentary committees—especially three that I emphasise, including the Financial Oversight Committee. If these committees function properly, then considering just the Prime Minister’s powers is not enough. The powers of the cabinet, and the corruption allegations against them, can be restrained through these committees. The executive’s power will be significantly restrained. We are not trying to weaken the executive—they run the country—but we are keeping them accountable; there is a mechanism for accountability.
BNP has repeatedly said that if the provisions for PSC, ACC, and judicial appointments are implemented as you proposed, the executive branch’s hands and feet would be tied. How do you see this?
Why would their hands and feet be tied? Take the PSC, for example—it belongs to the state. The executive branch will certainly want it to function efficiently, on a merit basis, right? Or will it want someone from my party, someone I know, regardless of whether they are qualified or not? Answer that question first, and then I can answer whether I’ve tied their hands and feet.
We are talking about the PSC. If you want to create an efficient bureaucracy in a country to run the state, why should political considerations intervene? Why should the Prime Minister personally move things around to decide? There is a process for this. Make that process as transparent as possible. Ensure that nothing happens within it that goes against your interests—not just as Prime Minister, but as a citizen as well.
I say this partly jokingly, partly seriously—why would their hands and feet be tied there?
The decision is that the same person cannot hold the positions of party chief and Prime Minister. But the BNP says that in parliamentary democracies around the world, there is no such provision. The democratic right to decide who will be Prime Minister and party chief belongs to the party.
In the world, there is only one country where the Prime Minister’s term is fixed—that is Thailand, eight years. We have done ten years. In fact, when this proposal came up in discussion—whether it should be two terms—the BNP representative said, “Make it ten years.” That doesn’t exist anywhere else in the world.
If a constitutional decree is issued regarding the implementation of the July Charter, does that mean a constitutional caretaker system has been established?
No.
The constitutional decree includes a caretaker government. So once this decree is issued, the caretaker government is returning to the constitution, right?
When the caretaker government is validated in the constitution, you are skipping the validation step. That comes first.
The proposal you have brought to discussion says that the decree will take immediate effect.
It will take effect. But until it is validated, you cannot implement everything. That is why the constitutional order is being specified.
Suppose the order is issued today—does that mean the July Charter has become part of the constitution?
Regarding becoming part of the constitution, it says that later it will become so. It is effective in the sense that the commitments included under it are being implemented. So there is no reason to think that the constitution will be completely changed immediately.
Even in these areas, I would say that our experts have given their opinions, and we are ready to discuss them. First, we need to decide whether it is correct to enter this process. If it is correct to proceed, then any errors or inadequacies will need to be corrected. I am trying to explain here; I am not defending it. Keep in mind, this is not the commission’s proposal—it is the proposal given to the commission by the experts.
Some political parties have said it is fine; some have said it is not. We will discuss further and see where it goes. When we submit it to the government, we will need to sit with the experts again. If, after considering the discussions with the political parties, we decide to present it as a recommendation, we will have to talk to them a bit more.
Initially, our experts integrated the referendum and the constitutional order into a single proposal. We gave that to the political parties. Some say there are errors, some say it is perfect.
A political party that led the establishment of a state in this country in 1947 was wiped out in an election just six years later.
In any case, if the interim government implements such a decree regarding the July Charter, will national elections be possible under this government? Because the July Charter mentions elections under a caretaker government.
This government can hold elections under Article 106 of the constitution. Another aspect is moral. Politically, if you look, where does this government’s greatest legitimacy lie?
I am not talking about the government’s legitimacy. Since you are issuing an order, the July Charter becomes effective. It states that national elections will be held under a caretaker government. This government is not a caretaker government. So will they hold elections, or must elections be held only after forming another caretaker government?
No, that will not be necessary. This is because, as you mentioned, until it is validated, all provisions are not being implemented. It must be validated—the order is being issued for validation, taking it to the people. So I don’t think you will have to change the government tomorrow or delay elections until the bicameral parliament is established.
But what I have said again is that, in principle, if consensus is reached among political parties at this stage—or at least an alternative is agreed upon—we will discuss it with the experts and try to address any errors or deficiencies. If we then see that it is not acceptable, we will reconsider it. This is not the final word.
In the first phase, the Consensus Commission held discussions with 33 parties, and in the second phase with 30 parties. Many unregistered parties exist, while many registered ones do not. What were your criteria for selecting parties for these discussions?
There were two criteria. The first consideration was that we did not consider those who were associated with the previous fascist regime, who supported it and legitimized it, to have any role in democratization or democratic transition.
The second criterion was the list we had when we started work in February 2025. From August 2024, the Chief Adviser’s office had periodically held discussions with political parties. A continuous list emerged from that, which we used, with a few additions in one or two cases.
Jatiya Party was initially in meetings with the Chief Adviser as well.
We considered Jatiya Party’s role as supportive of the continuation of the fascist regime.
The draft of the July Charter says that political parties represent the people, making the charter an expression of the people’s will. But a question has arisen: most of these 30 parties had no parliamentary representation in the past. So what percentage of the people’s representation do you think is being captured here? Some people even raised this in the commission’s discussions.
Many people have repeatedly asked this, citing registered parties or past elections. It is a very flawed argument. When we began the process, the Awami League was a registered party. Do you think it was necessary to consult with Awami League? I don’t think so.
Jamaat-e-Islami and NCP were not registered parties. Should we have excluded them from discussions? They had a role in the movement.
Let me explain further, because I am hearing these questions. They did not receive votes in elections. When was the last election held? Even 2008 is considered controversial by some. Now, when it comes to street movements, did we calculate, “You have 0.2% support, so you cannot participate in this movement”?
It cannot be an argument that the number of votes you received in the last election determines your representation or seat size in discussions.
BNP’s Salahuddin Ahmad has also said in your discussions that political parties do not fully represent the people.
Don’t go by percentages. Where would you get that calculation from? From the vote percentages in the last election? The 2014 election? BNP’s last participation was in 2018. Should I calculate that percentage? Would that be correct? Then what percentage are you talking about?
Some people suddenly become statisticians, quoting all these statistics: 32 per cent, 18 per cent, whatever percentages. Where are the sources? By what method did you arrive at these figures? Are you excluding 40 per cent of the population and calling it a national consensus? Show me the calculation for that 40 cent.
A political party that led the establishment of a state in this country in 1947 was wiped out in an election just six years later.
The calculations and statistics based on percentages are extremely flawed. Our criterion is: who stood up, risking their lives, in the struggle for the democratic aspirations of the people of Bangladesh? Not everyone stood equally, that’s true. But one death, one martyrdom, is very significant. Are you going to ask which party Abu Sayed belonged to? Do you want to ask which party Wasim belonged to?
Yes, outside political parties, there is a space for public opinion. Of course there is. Each commission met separately with civil society. The Constitution Reform Commission collected opinions from over 100,000 people and held discussions with more than 30–40 civil society organisations.
One kind of allegation has also come up in the Consensus Commission discussions—that you are giving too much importance to the BNP.
We cannot control perception. People may feel that way. Again, some have said other things. Now, who perceived what and how, everything happened in plain sight. Did the commission actually show bias toward anyone? Did that happen? No. Some people may have felt that way, and that’s possible.
Regarding the implementation of the Charter, BNP, Jamaat, and NCP have given three different opinions. Could these differences jeopardize the Charter or affect the next election?
I will not comment on elections. There is still a lot of time, and even a single day can be long in election terms. Regarding the Charter, we are optimistic—no one is raising objections to the core issues of the Charter. I hope everyone will sign it. But alongside the expectation of signatures, we must remember that political parties have reached consensus through a long process with everyone aware. Will they be able to back out just because they don’t sign on paper? I don’t think so.
If elections are not held, there is a risk of internal political instability, which could pose a threat to national security. Political parties must understand this
Discussions are ongoing regarding the Charter’s implementation. Meanwhile, a few parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, who are still in the discussion, have started political programs based on the July Charter, including elections. BNP says this is contradictory. How do you see this?
Political activities outside the commission are considered solely as party activities. As long as they are not raised in the commission’s forum, we will not take any official position or comment on them. Every political party has the right to carry out its programs in various ways.
Will street movements or political programs have any impact on the Consensus Commission?
So far, they haven’t. We hope that during the remaining time, they won’t have any impact either.
National elections are scheduled for February. The nation is looking at your commission. Do you see any uncertainty regarding the February elections?
I do not see any uncertainty so far. I believe elections must definitely be held in February. If elections are not held, there is a risk of internal political instability, which could pose a threat to national security. Political parties must understand this. Everyone needs to come together. The government must take a firm position, bring the political parties together, and ensure that the elections are conducted.
Thank you.
Thank you as well.