What kind of friendship is this to not ask India any reciprocation?

When the head of government visits a neighbouring state twice within a span of just two weeks, there certainly must be something special about the relations between the two countries. That was clear in the joint statement of the two prime ministers too. They mentioned the fact that prime minister Sheikh Hasina visited Delhi twice in a matter of two weeks, saying that this was proof of the sincerity and strength of friendship.

The Press Journal of India described the distinctiveness of these bilateral relations. Journalist Jayanta Roy Chowdhury  wrote there that “Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India ahead of a trip to Beijing was thus all about assuring Delhi that if there is one bright spot left where its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy was working it was in the corridors of power in Dhaka.”

He held up a dismal picture of India’s relations with its other neighbours in South Asia, saying that its relations with Pakistan were frozen in time, Nepal has been veering towards the Chinese orbit and squabbling with India over a map which shows bits and pieces of Kumaon as part of its territory, and Bhutan, in its anxious quest to not antagonise a rising China, is currently busy negotiating its border with Beijing. (Neighbourhood Diplomacy: Dhaka, India’s Only Best Friend? 23 June 2024).

He also reminded the readers that the president of Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, appeared on stage with the prime minister Modi during his swearing-in ceremony, but continues in his remarkably pro-Chinese decisions including asking India to take back the few dozen soldiers posted there and cancelling several strategic discussions with India.

Sri Lanka, caught in a Chinese debt trap over expensive projects it signed up for with Beijing has recently announced that China would help “restructure” its loans and also develop more infrastructure on the island. He says, “The circumstances are such that India has only Dhaka to fall back on in the neighbourhood as a ‘good friend’.”

Over the past few days the reports and articles appearing in the Indian press concerning Sheikh Hasina’s visit mostly highlight that till now Delhi is ahead in the race with Beijing to keep Dhaka at their side. Though the issue of Teesta River water management is in focus, the extent and expanse of the overall areas of understanding has a lot more significance.

It was undoubtedly unexpected that a nod was given to India to carry out a study without any funding proposal regarding the conservation and management of Teesta water despite the long-standing standstill in the matter of sharing Teesta’s waters. However, prime minister Sheikh Hasina did say that, between the proposals or China and India, she would select which ever she felt was more beneficial.

After the Indian election, prime minister Narendra Modi’s comparatively weak third term still hasn’t gained momentum as yet. Despite that, prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s hurried visit is obviously linked to her China schedule. While the Indian news media quite clearly points this out, we haven’t quite heard anyone speak of this in such definite terms.

Deccan Herald’s enthusiastic headlines read, “India elbows out China from river conservation project in Bangladesh.” Kolkata’s Telegraph read, “Delhi's Teesta offer to scuttle China ambition in Bangladesh, Dhaka focus on water-sharing.” It wrote, “India is desperate to prevent the Teesta’s management going into Chinese hands, for that will not only signal a failure of hydro-diplomacy with its most trusted neighbour but also carry major strategic concerns.” Times of India wrote: “Eye on China: India to held Bangladesh conserve Teesta river.”

Meanwhile, the letter sent by Mamata Banerjee to prime minister Modi in all likelihood will pose as a considerable obstacle to both management of Teesta’s waters and renewal of the Ganges treaty. It is because of Mamata Banerjee’s contention that river water management is the state’s jurisdiction, that Delhi could not, or did not, approve the Teesta agreement for over the past decade. It would be more accurate to say “did not”, rather than “could not”, because if Delhi had decided upon implementing the Teesta agreement, the matter possibly would have been settled in India’s Supreme Court.

It is because of the Indian Supreme Court’s role in resolving inter-state water conflicts that this reasoning may arise. After blocking Teesta, the manner in which Mamata Banerjee has written to Modi about the various complications created by Farakka, it seems that the frustration over not receiving the promised share of Ganges water will simply be exacerbated in the days to come.

There is noticeably a difference within the media in India as to whether Bangladesh has proven its trustworthiness as friend to India or not. Almost all of them have expressed concern over the direction of the movement in Bangladesh to boycott India goods, comparing this to the Maldives. But this has been outweighed by the outward expression of their satisfaction with the outcome of prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit, despite the boycott movement.

The achievements that they list include the agreement to start talks on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), expanding railway connectivity, joint military hardware manufacture and modernisation of the armed forces, digital and green partnership, and joint space projects. Of this, special importance has been attached to defence cooperation, as an opportunity to curb China’s long-standing upper hand in this sector.

When the prime minister returned after such a trip to India in 2018, she had said that India will forever remember what we have given them (30 May 2018, at a press briefing in Ganabhaban). From the MoUs signed this time it is evident that the giving has not ended. When asked about a headline in Anandabazar Patrika to the effect that ‘Bangladesh wants reciprocation from India’, she had replied, “I do not want anything in return. What is there to return?” It seems she still maintains that stand of not wanting anything in return.

Europe is a good example of railway connectivity. However, our so-called connectivity can in no way be compared to the railway network throughout the European continent. The benefits of expanding our connectivity are basically restricted to India and only one side stands to gain. Only if the connectivity is extended to the entire South Asia can this be compared to Europe. Yet the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is more or less dead and that is because of the political conflict between India and Pakistan. This has now been compounded by the impact of India’s political conflict with China.

It is not that the influence of geopolitics is limited to foreign policy or defence policy alone. Surely there is no need to reiterate how harmful and intense the impact is on democracy and human rights as well.

* Kamal Ahmed is a senior journalist

* This column appeared in the print and online edition of Prothom Alo and has been rewritten for the English edition by Ayesha Kabir